Showing posts with label morality. Show all posts
Showing posts with label morality. Show all posts

Saturday, January 16, 2021

Michel Houllebecq's "Serotonin": Book Review

I was going to give this a respectable, solid 4 stars, same as I would most of his novels, which I have enjoyed or cringed at ever since "Platform" and "Whatever" in the '90s. But the last few paragraphs sent this meditation-lament about getting middle-aged, losing libido, having nobody younger notice you anymore, and the general state of a deracinated, de-Christianized liberty-for-all France into a different stratosphere than his typical works. His sharp take on what neo-liberal capitalism, laissez-faire morality, relentless competition from homogenized products and global markets have done to the "Western European" mindset and lifestyle--at least among the comfortable upper-middle classes--has grown more pointed over the past couple of decades. While the Islamic dystopia imagined in "Submission" may not come to pass as soon as fictionalized, the atmosphere in which "Serotonin" floats is all around us. 

And, like the late Mark E Smith of The Fall, Michel Houellebecq makes me chuckle a lot. They share that morbid, droll, and often an allusive-elusive sense of dark humor. One of many: when the narrator contemplates getting away for a lonely Christmas, to stave off temptations of doing himself in, he finds the monasteries are all full of retreatants, ironically or intentionally, given the secularized nation he's part of. 

However, his psychiatrist muses, he might go off to Thailand instead, as flights are cheap and seats open over the holidays, to try his luck with a couple of teenaged hookers. The juxtaposition of these options, told by him (in Shaun Whiteside's smooth translation--check out his version of Wu Ling's "Q"), is rendered deftly on the page far better than I could do here. A companion to this might be a similar semi-autobiographical writer, his compatriot Emmanuel Carrere, in such as "The Kingdom," note.

<a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/45030208-serotonin" style="float: left; padding-right: 20px"><img border="0" alt="Serotonin: A Novel" src="https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1598552650l/45030208._SX98_.jpg" /></a><a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/45030208-serotonin">Serotonin: A Novel</a> by <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/author/show/32878.Michel_Houellebecq">Michel Houellebecq</a><br/>
My rating: <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/review/show/3772717976">5 of 5 stars</a><br /><br />

Wednesday, April 19, 2017

David Foster Wallace's "Brief Interviews With Hideous Men": Audiobook Review


Brief Interviews with Hideous Men | Gorgeous Book Covers | Pinterest

One blurb lauds the "hilarious" content herein. It's brief, compared to that bent on a harrowing evocation of the titular hideousness. On audio, there is talent applied diligently by a variety of youngish male actors. But this for four hours bogs down into a combination of raw (more ways than one) material for future dramatic monologues for auditions, and what feels, intentionally surely, the transcripts of a variety of depressed, bitter, lustful, wry, and/or erudite (as the author) case studies.

Halfway, #46 does reach an apex of ingenuity. The metaphorical and moral connections between Viktor Frankl's suffering endured that produced his Man's Search for Meaning and the assault perpetrated with a Jack Daniel's bottle on a teen victim ensure that no reader or listener will ever think of that Holocaust memoir-treatise the same from now on. Yet, as with the content overall, the ending's not surprising. These sound, as DFW intended I assume, as character studies of the dark side. But, as with a surfeit of crime fiction, true or imagined, the consumer may be weary too early.

There's an exhaustive determination to record betrayals, rapes, defecation, disgust, hatred, ennui, resentment, and doomed power-plays, and manipulation, in sex and other exchanges turned violent. It's surely what you see is what you get, but this is not a series of themes I care to return to. David Foster Wallace possesses insight, verisimilitude, and intelligence. But the degree to which he forces himself and then us to listen to these revelations batters you down. "His eyes were holes in the world" is how one woman sums up her attacker, tellingly for these blunt themes. (Amazon US 4-17-17)

Wednesday, August 19, 2015

Lex Bayer + John Migdor's "Atheist Mind, Humanist Heart": Book Review

If you don't believe in God or gods, what then? Stanford humanist chaplain Migdor and his colleague, Silicon Valley entrepreneur Lex Bayer, offer a reasonable, calmly argued, and philosophically constructed set of Ten "Non-commandments" aimed to guide the growing numbers of non-believers along a straightforward path.

The first five emerge from atheist tenets based on observable reality to distinguish truth from false claims. Data and evidence derive from what can be tested and what is open to verification, correction, rejection, or acceptance. Basically and unsurprisingly, the authors establish that truth-claims about divine existence fail to explain why one manifestation is to be proven among myriad competitors past and present, and they offer a stimulating analogy to a "religious lottery" (50). A secular spin on Pascal's wager, this game of chance means no believer in this life can be sure that his or her choice will "pay off" as opposed to competing versions of a deity or gods. Religion is redefined as a "set of starting assumptions" rather than truth-claims able to be verified. God, the authors assert, is an assumption rather than a belief. (53) "Beliefs are simply inserted into a space left empty by a lack of effort." (136) Strong words in a generally genial study. However, Bayer and Migdor roll out a logical response that confirms that belief in an unseen presence with the names we are most familiar with is no different than that which insists elves or Thor or Babalú must exist.

There may endure a "high level of confidence" among atheists (whom they align more or less with humanists and agnostics early on if with some slight delineation) that God may not exist. But the writers also agree with Richard Dawkins' 6.9 (who ranks himself on his scale, 7 as total non-belief) that the odds are stacked against divine existence. Still, logically total certainty can never be claimed.

The second half of this brief book articulates the humanist comfort gained when one acts to increase the well-being and happiness of others, and so ensures more contentment for one's self. No facile reduction to Utilitarianism, yet this asserts a thoughtful consideration of how we may treat each other better. I found the tone shift here, as a more relaxed, expansive attitude appeared to replace the rigor of the preceding section. I was not sure if one author took charge of one part more than the other, or if the subject matter created its own mood, but it was noticeable from the start of the ethical portion.

Overall, this is very readable. I expected a refutation of the classic ontological arguments of Anselm, the teleological and cosmological ones of Aquinas, the argument from design by Paley. But no trace of these terms, or even Primum Mobile or uncaused cause, watchmakers or a 747 in a junkyard can be found. So, this may fit the needs as the authors encourage of more of a self-study book for those needing reflection and direction towards a more articulate type of non-belief. Two pages are included so you can make up your own tenets to mull over, for in this process, the authors find their own rationales have been tested and made stronger. I like the conversations they have with each other that show how one person's range of subjective views build up one's moral standards. They refuse any universal objective set of morals can be defined. I wish more depth had been given to the common challenges to this, and in the "Common Religious Objections" to some of the venerable theorems for God's existence. For, these will be faced by nearly anyone tackling this in conversation or debate with Christian believers. Only one medieval thinker is mentioned. Cleverly, Ockham's Razor is applied to advance the logical preference for the simplest explanation for what we observe, God-free.

Bayer and Migdor favor reasonable interactions, to strengthen community, and a just, rational society. They turn to the case of the Boston bomber who hid under a boat and wrote on its hull a literally "unintelligible" scrawl justifying in the name of Allah the immoral action perpetuated by "heinous acts" such as the bombers carried out. (117) This haunting comparison reminds readers of the irrational motives which continue to attempt to rally people in a supposedly advanced century to take on outmoded and illogical rationales to perpetrate violence upon those outside their own belief system. Such fanatics chant the name of one of the many competing versions of God or gods which Migdor and Bayer seek to prove as false. (Amazon US 12-11-14; Vote for beliefs; author's website)

Friday, May 29, 2015

Debt and taxes

Since I posted last time about Jeremy Hammond, the hacker now serving a ten-year Federal sentence for exposing collusion between the government and Statfor, as to how anti-terrorism laws are being used or misused by the FBI, I noticed this in my FB feed. As Hammond (see that piece) defines himself as an anarcho-communist, I wondered how such a philosophy, if made our politics, might look. Gary "Z." McGee asserts "5 Reasons Why Anarchy Would Be an Improvement in Human Governance." But whereas the likes of Hammond argue that grassroots, anti-capitalist, decentralized systems of cooperation would supplant the top-down coercion which is business as usual, McGee alludes, while not quite defining, a "cosmic law" and the possibility that choices could be not only moral but amoral--yet never immoral, in such a model of how people might get along and thrive. 

He gives #1 as checks and balances. McGee claims 95% of human history (or prehistory) has been Fierce Egalitarian Hierarchy. Food, shelter, protection had to be shared, as the clan had to survive. He wants us know to place first freedom, then health, then a recognition of the interconnection of all. This reminds me of Gary Snyder's Buddhist Anarchism, articulated by him back in the 1960s.  McGee agrees, but the quirk of "amoral" I find noteworthy, as I don't recall this term being used earlier. "The monumental problem with our Statist society is that we are not taught to be as moral or as amoral as we need to be in order to maintain a healthy cosmic, ecological, and social order. In fact, statism purposefully forces whatever the state decrees to be healthy, as healthy, whether or not it is actually healthy according to cosmic law." Maybe that "cosmic" law aligns with Snyder's interbeing?

As I wrote about earlier this week, the "industry of death" decried by Pope Francis and Jimmy Carter recently ties into the #2 point of McGee. He asks: "How does anarchy flip the tables on the authorization and glorification of plunder? It prevents plunder from ever becoming possible because anarchy-based modes of governance are engineered in such a way that groups never get to the point of concentrated centers of power. The monopolization of power never gets to the point to where it becomes corrupt, because of controlled leveling mechanisms such as reverse dominance and wealth expiation. Like Jim Dodge said, 'Anarchy doesn’t mean out of control; it means out of their control.' Whoever 'they' may be: monopolizing corporations, overreaching governments, tyrants." We all wonder, at least those of us less enamored with capitalism and intrusion by entities above us, how the power switch might happen. As David Graeber devoted his big book on debt to revealing, the power of banks to print money, charge interest on it, and keep the masses indebted underlies this injustice.

A bit awkward in McGee's expression, but as the weather reports remind us daily by now, the ecological perspective ties in to #3. "In a system of human governance that is systematically transforming livingry into weaponry, it is the supreme duty of all healthy, moral, compassionate, eco-conscious, indeed anarchist, people to question authority to the nth degree." Similarly, #4 seeks reciprocity as an ethical basis for "expiation of wealth" by an ecologically sustainable distribution.

Finally, he conjures up Thoreau's non-conformity as a reminder of the power of leaders who can rally change. McGee cites Martin Luther King, Jr.: “The hope of a secure livable world lies with disciplined nonconformists, who are dedicated to justice, peace, and brotherhood. The trailblazers in human, academic, scientific, and spiritual freedom have always been nonconformists. In any cause that concerns the progress of mankind, put your faith in the nonconformist.” Hammond to Chris Hedges spoke the same way, and I happen to be reading John Lydon's "Anger is an Energy" where he tells us that his own enemies have never been human beings, but institutions, in his own struggle.

Very few look to Assange, Manning, Snowden, Hammond, Lydon, or McGee as role-models. We are forcibly taxed for the war machines, the prison complexes, the collusion of lenders and universities, and Obamacare as the safety net for the "benefits" corporations refuse to grant exploited workers. Not to mention the rise of automation, reliance on "contingent" labor, and the reduction of secure jobs. The militarization of the police, the trillions wasted on the security state at home and abroad, the damage to the earth, the uncontrolled levels of population increase and immigration, the refusal to address global warming. All the while, we gush over the latest "outrage" by pro athletes or reality show celebrities. My students keep leashed to their phones, and I wonder if literacy will survive long.

While many claim to inherit the mantle of King, few consider the complexity of pacifism and non-violence as opposed to what Hammond argues, the decision to fight back. Looking at Tibet over my lifetime, as it was taken over not long before my birth, I acknowledge the Dalai Lama's decision not to worsen his homeland by calling for an uprising, but I sympathize with the younger generations who have given over to despair, and self-immolation in the extreme cases, as the Chinese supplant the Tibetans with the Han, with the foreign language, with the prohibition of the native language and customs, and I cannot see how these can survive within the heartland much longer unless as staged folk pageants or monastic museums for tourists who now take the train to Lhasa. All this reminds me of the Nazi plan to establish a Yiddish heritage display when the Reich triumphed, and I remain torn between the ideal of non-violent resistance and the frustration as again, a nation and a tradition face extinction. We might add to this our own global predicament at the hands of multinationals and superpowers. Will we rise up against the one percent, or will we, hoping to become our masters, still bow and cringe? The John Adams quote above shows how our war and our debt together enslave us.

Friday, April 17, 2015

Stepping out of line


https://firstworldwarhiddenhistory.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/step-into-your-place-poster.jpg
I asked a few days ago here "Is It Immoral to Serve?" I found this through Gerry Cappa's FB feed only yesterday: "Why a Top U.S Marine Became a Conscientious Objector" in Aeon. Lyle Rubin, a fellow Marine vet, interviews 1st Lt. Jacob Bridge. Curious about this transformation, and as my previous entry considered how many (or rather how few to date) vets I taught would in hindsight discourage others from enlisting, I excerpt highlights.

He signed up in high school, from a traditional upbringing. He went to a leftist bastion, the U. of Colorado, and his time in Boulder in ROTC made him more conservative. During training, he could not handle the disconnect between the pride of "The Fleet" and the immorality and cynicism of those actually in command and as his peers. A skilled leader who got to know his troops, he bristled at the disparity, and he sought therapy from a Unitarian chaplain, with whom he began to reveal his moral doubts as he grew more confident. He had an epiphany about his mortality and his hatred of what he was becoming in a culture of death.

"People change, especially in their early to mid-20s. When they say: ‘You signed the oath in the contract,’ I say: ‘Well, when I signed the contract I was borderline alcoholic, pretty homophobic, and a bunch of other things that I’m not now. I’m not the same person who signed that contract.’" You can see in the comments appended on the website how some refuse to cut Bridge any slack here.

Viktor Frankl's Man and the Search for Meaning helped guide his ethical progress. I like that Bridge does not identify with any particular faith, although he admits some elements from Buddhism as guiding him. Likewise, when Rubin asks Bridge if he has been influenced by previous conscientious objectors, he responds: "I’m very wary of including myself in another honoured lineage because here I am trying to break out of one." In his current posting in Hawai'i, he finds support from another C.O., Jeff Paterson, who leads a team representing Chelsea Manning, as well as Ann Wright, who resigned her Gulf War diplomatic post for the Quaker community. He concludes encouragingly: "The peace/nonviolence/antiwar community in Hawaii is about as robust as they come, and they found me in the nick of time." I wish him and fellow dissidents well, as they question what too few seem to do.

Saturday, April 11, 2015

Is it immoral to serve?




We commonly heard it said "thank you for your service" in post-9/11 America. So, I ask my veteran or current on-duty students if they'd recommend their choice to others contemplating enlisting. They've returned to get degrees on the G.I. Bill; there is a V.A. hospital nearby campus that attracts many. At least a few after their combat come back disabled mentally, others physically. Many others are happy if a bit weary after their tours of duty, including a spirited woman tallying 37 years in the Army at present. Most say they'd encourage others. A "party girl" from Miami turned her life around by choosing to join the Coast Guard. A stalwart Texas student came back with a prosthetic leg and a year of therapy learning to walk on it, but also a determination to stay motivated; he landed a great job and convinced his cousin, also a veteran, to take classes from me a few years later; as different as the quiet, affable one, a young father and quite modest, and his boisterous, tattooed and orange-work suited and greasy pipe fitter booted relative were, they both succeeded, articulately and admirably.

As an aside, after I wrote this original post, in a threaded discussion this week with many high-achieving students in a class made up mostly of veterans, one wrote when we chatted online about the impact of globalization, competition among lower-waged workers with immigrants, the role our effort plays vs. the privilege or discrimination many claim for themselves, and the hardship of getting more than entry-level jobs (despite our government's and economy's much-touted "recovery"):
It annoys me to no end when people look for hand outs because they are X or they did Y. It reminds me of when my battalion was coming back from deployment and our Sergeant Major spoke with us before getting on the planes to bring us back. He told us with no question, but rather 100% certainty "No one cares." The speech is much longer and many other choice words are used but the main message is that no one cares. Not that people don't support the military, or that they won't be appreciative of what we did, but they can not begin to know what we went through. No one cares because they can only sympathize. No one cares because they didn't choose to do what we did. So to expect anything special is ignorant.

That full on hit me in the most when I applied at King's Fish House here in Huntington Beach. They had walk-in interviews and I started out as a server, and then a bus boy because I wasn't qualified to be a server, which I have no background as a server so I didn't blame them. But then got a call back asking me if I wouldn't mind washing dishes because I wasn't qualified to bus tables. Each time the next person would thank me for my service and tell me how much they appreciated what I did. I was very annoyed with them, and have never stepped in that restaurant since. And even though I could tell they sympathized and supported the military, they did not care and they were not going to make a business decision that would not benefit them.

A few disagree with enlisting in hindsight, but very few to date. I stumbled across this today when searching for a different topic entirely, and so I share it. Glen T. Martin argues with Three Reasons Why it is Immoral to Serve in the Military of Any Country. I'm reminded of Max Aue's words near the start of the immense epic by Jonathan Littell, The Kindly Ones. In my review of this novel a few years ago, I singled out key passages, as these have often been overlooked by critics of this story  told by a gay man, blackmailed, who then joins the SS. He narrates his unsettling version of events.

"If the State one must serve is made up of ordinary folks, some will find themselves on the wrong side of history, then as now, not by a chosen career path or personal preference, but by the pressures of bureaucracy and the exigencies of the moment that pressure people into acting. Not all victims are good and not all executioners are evil, Aue reasons.

The State, both sides agree as do we, must exist, must call its male citizens to take lives in its name and its female ones to serve its demands. Free will vanishes if a soldier is assigned to a concentration camp or mobile killing battalion: "chance alone makes him a killer rather than a hero, or a dead man." (592) We give up the right not to kill and our own right to life, if male, he warns, to do our wartime duty to our masters.

"The real danger for mankind is me, is you. And if you're not convinced of this, don't bother to read any further. You'll understand nothing and you'll get angry, with little profit for you or for me." (21)


The counter-arguments are legion. Google "pacifism" into an image search for angry memes. Despite them, a Quaker image I liked via my review of Nicholson Baker's Human Smoke, more controversy.
P.S. Thanks to Carrie McIntyre for noting "The Lives of Others" and "Barbara" as congenial with Aue, and to Matt Cavanaugh for urging me to "The Baader-Meinhof Complex," and Four Minutes.

Tuesday, December 30, 2014

Rota Fortunae

What happens when a paycheck is the ideal? Thinking about the persistent mantra that we hear from the government and popular media, the message equates job attainment with personal satisfaction. It's as if once employed, one's worries are assumed to end. Easy to complain about work until it ends. Having witnessed people I have known for decades undergo "voluntary separations" and "reductions in force," at least five cycles since the recession began, this causes me sleeplessness and worry. With my son and wife, I watched the alternative, worst-case (seemingly) scenario in the Belgian film Deux Jours, Une Nuit: "A woman and her husband have to convince her colleagues to give up bonuses so she keeps her job" as the summation pithily puts it. Reflecting on her predicament, I felt very uneasy.

While I pondered this dramatized (but very low-key, realistic, unsentimental) case study, I imagined my coworkers debating this about me, and I wondered if the scenario was reversed how I'd vote, for or against a Christmas bonus. This was, however, moot as when my son asked how much such a bonus was, I had no idea. I realized, reviewing the jobs I've had since I started working at sixteen, that I have never been given a holiday gift by a delegated representative linked to my paycheck. I confess I do not rush into seasonal festivities mandating cheer, so this may be my karmic payback.

People I work with chortle about going to Costco, about bargains at Wal-Mart, about their shopping sprees. But I see far too much stuff around me, and with more housing bulldozed around me any day now, I feel hemmed in by more people, more noise, more traffic, more pressure. But when I read Michael Mott's biography The Seven Mountains of Thomas Merton, I reflected that Merton, despite his yearning to be a hermit, kept up his book buying, and loved his Dylan records and his brandy. Buddhists claim that one can possess items without having them possess the owner. Tyler Durden's rejoinder in Fight Club comes to mind as a riposte: "do you own your things, or do they own you?"

"The frustration and emptiness so many people feel at this time of year is not an objection to the abundance per se, nor should it be. It is a healthy hunger for nonattachment. This season, don’t rail against the crowds of shoppers on Fifth Avenue or become some sort of anti-gift misanthrope. Celebrate the bounty that has pulled millions out of poverty worldwide. But then, ponder the three practices" in "Abundance Without Attachment," Arthur C. Brooks urges. "Move beyond attachment by collecting experiences, avoid excessive usefulness, and get to the center of your wheel."

Brooks encourages travel that sticks in the memory, and activities worth savoring long after they end, rather than goods accumulated. He defines this by way of a classical guideline, even if this direction may waver in my daily life. I teach at an institution promoting efficiency, attainment of skills, career security, and practicality rather than the ambitions of the liberal arts which I represent, if quixotically.

He explains: "Our daily lives often consist of a dogged pursuit of practicality and usefulness at all costs. This is a sure path toward the attachment we need to avoid. Aristotle makes this point in his Nicomachean Ethics; he shows admiration for learned men because 'they knew things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but useless.'” Not sure I could justify my course outcomes and mandated terminal curricular objectives but it's a sober corrective, if wishful thinking, against the manic push for standardization, regulation, and profit. This spreads far beyond my cohort.

Last night I read William James' 1903 essay "The Ph.D. Octopus"; he feared the takeover of American higher education by the same grinding servility to rank, degrees, and status indulged in by a sclerotic German university system. James opined, from his Harvard tenure, how "the institutionizing on a large scale of any natural combination of need and motive always tends to run into technicality and to develop a tyrannical Machine with unforeseen powers of exclusion and corruption." Now, MOOCs are championed, online rather than classroom courses, and credit for work or life experiences, even by the University of California, as four-year degrees no matter what or where must be streamlined. Lowering of standards contends against assurances that the latest is the best to "deliver" the "modality" students want, via the medium that you and I use to connect here.

Aristotle, the wisdom of the East, the temptations of the West even for monks and hermits, the pursuit of the arts not mechanical or tied to slaves or manual labor or the grind but to liberate a free person: this legacy takes in all these influences. We are told every day how we must consume information, products, and services, and how if we try to drop out as a few in Merton's time and ours do, we shirk our economic duty. If you do drop out, like Merton, how much must your community do for you?

The Ethicist (in the same issue as Brooks' article in NY Times) was asked: My 28-year-old son has decided to become a novelist. He recently took a part-time job at a grocery store, working just 15 hours a week to pay his bills, leaving him enough time to write. His low income qualifies him for Medicaid. He could work more if he chose to. Considering this, do taxpayers have a responsibility to provide health coverage for him? Does it matter if this is a short- or long-term strategy? 

Brooks (but after I drafted this, I found NYT letters challenging his affirmation of accumulation galore) puts his liberal education to good use, if not tangible GNP profit beyond his paycheck, as he considers Chaucer's "rota fortunae" (wheel of fortune) and Tibetan "do chag" ("sticky desire") as the contexts to apply to our search for meaning along with materialism. So, despite the fact he's funded as I now learn by a right-wing think-tank for that paycheck, he did generate my own entry, and now I understand some of the unease his encouragement of materialism set off in me. It's fitting, therefore, that I remain troubled rather than comforted by his advice to celebrate affluence, even as I am the beneficiary of it, along with the billions Brooks welcomes to capitalism. He sets up his essay for the conclusion that was my beginning for my blog entry, a wheel again. And so wraps up a year's cycle.
(Illustration: Wheel of Fortune/ Rota Fortunae)

Sunday, December 14, 2014

Big Brother, Little Sister

Lately, some European artists protest as if only those who were born into or who affirm a particular identity can claim entitlement to act as, speak for, or depict that identity's experience. The somewhat forced diction of my first sentence indicates the similarly awkward expression of this reductive claim. Sharing on FB an article I found from the imploding New Republic (another story that fits in neatly), Exhibit B: Really Useful Knowledge and Europe's Art Censorship, my friend mentioned Ray Bradbury's novel as part of the warning about closing off alternatives, refusing controversy, and socially dumbing down our sensitivities.

Lots to discuss; a few excerpts to spark reflection. Ross Douthat, the resident conservative columnist at the New York Times (not imploding, but as a Sunday-only home subscriber, I note it's going to cost $9 weekly for that and digital access; my dad exploded, my wife recalls, when he saw we paid $3.50 for the treasured old-school paper--it sure was thick not that long ago--less than two decades ago.), discussed the impact of "vertically integrated media" as in the takeover of The New Republic by a Silicon Valley VC:
So when we talk about what’s being lost in the transition from old to new, print to digital, it’s this larger, humanistic realm that needs attention. It isn’t just policy writing that’s thriving online; it’s anything that’s immediate, analytical, data-driven — from election coverage to pop culture obsessiveness to rigorous analysis of baseball’s trade market.

Like most readers, I devour this material. Like most journalists, I write some of it. I’m grateful that the outlets that produce it all exist.

But among publications old and new and reinvented, it’s also hard not to notice that John Oliver videos — or, more broadly, the array of food and sports and gadget sites that surround Klein’s enterprise at Vox Media — aren’t just paying for the policy analysis. They’re actively displacing other kinds of cultural coverage and interaction, in which the glibness of the everyday is challenged by ideas and forms older than a start-up, more subtle than a TV recap, more rigorous than a comedian’s monologue.
That last snippet caught my attention. A few days after it did, Obama regaled The Colbert Report crowd, surely his demographic as any show on Comedy Central by default, with his ten-minute entertainment, pumping Obamacare while keeping his voters clapping. This made my wife and probably millions of fellow Dems happy, but shades of Nixon on Laugh-In saying "sock it to me," this left me disturbed. This capitulation, which others such as my son and his friends at dinner just applauded as a wonderful demonstration of how Our President handles the media and the message, to what the hipper and I guess alas younger folks "want" unsettles me even as it appears inevitable.

In turn, Tiffany Jones in concluding her article on "Exhibit B" cautions against what happens when "we" as in the same cohort Obama and Colbert and (at least most of) Silicon Valley appeals to make demands as to what "they" want to see as art, and what they want art to stand for, past or present:
The premise of art is that one can think up and convincingly construct for others, across time and place, a different life, another experience which becomes real to the reader or viewer because it has been written, painted, performed—not because the audience has been there, seen it, or done it themselves. Just think of all your favorite productions, books, or paintings and how they differ from your personal experience but seduce you into believing in them.

At their core, these calls for censorship dictate that only certain groups or people can create art because only they have the experience. Underlying these protests, then, is the idea that we, the audience, are not capably of empathy, and that the purpose of art is not is not to create and convince people of other worlds but to reflect the reality as the self-selecting chosen ones see it. It is an exclusive and divisive outlook, and it is one that ultimately negates the basis of art.
Fahrenheit 451 as read by Tim Robbins, as reviewed by Dave Itzkoff, revealed a subtlety I admit I was surprised to find in that author. I met him when I was in college and he spoke; he seemed very eager to promote literacy and love of the written word at our literary festival, but he also seemed to like himself a lot. Still, he signed my paperback of The Martian Chronicles (it was out on t.v. as a miniseries in the days we watched such on networks en masse, before DVR, DVD or even VCR).

Itzkoff wonders if Robbins is "phoning in" his reading of the book, and whether such a delivery of what remains a paean to the printed word should rather be preserved as Bradbury intended it. He goes on to consider the power of the moral, as the printed word did not capitulate to censorship (as perhaps art is in "Exhibit B" under pressure of P.C. dogma and a growing refusal to challenge certain religious oppositions to explicit or daring content, as well as the burgeoning industry bent on coddling us all against anything deemed disturbing, graphic, unsettling, or merely confronting our congeries of what we bundled up and thrust about as "identity" against presumably all who are less enlightened than us). Itzkoff concludes his review of Robbins' audiobook with a rousing recall to take up books, again:
But Bradbury knew, 60 years ago, that more seductive, less effective forms of information conveyance were coming to tempt even the most diligent and dedicated acolytes of the printed word, and that it was not a distant stretch from dismissing books as quaint and obsolete to banning them outright. As Captain Beatty explains to Montag, recounting how audiences’ attentions drifted from books to television, cartoons, “super-super sports” and “three-dimensional sex magazines”: “There was no dictum, no declaration, no censorship, to start with, no! Technology, mass exploitation and minority pressure carried the trick, thank God.”

To the end of his life, Bradbury seemed surprised that he had to keep explaining that the novel was not about the dangers of government censorship or authoritarian rule; as he told his biographer Sam Weller, “ ‘Fahrenheit 451’ is less about Big Brother and more about Little Sister.” By this he seemed to mean all the small discouragements and impediments that take us away from our intellectual pursuits, whether peer pressure, encroaching technology or apathy. Fortunately, a few thousand years ago, we gave ourselves a sustainable and still reliable mechanism to provide shelter from these distractions, as well as the option to use it or not. It is a choice as simple, and as significant, as the decision to light up a mind or to extinguish it.
As for me, I close this brief scan of how the media play into our pleasures by considering the BBC series Black Mirror, as Layne and I binge-watched in three sittings its six parables to date about the pressure technology poses to break our cherished identity and control over our privacy and intimacy in the name of ethics; about a pair of contestants for an American Idol type of contest eerily extrapolated in a manner only half-explained, the better for it to grip you; about how memories can be recorded for instant recall; about the way that a loved one's words and voice, and then presence, might be resurrected and recreated; about how a pursuit for justice might well mingle with a fun day's excursion; and about how nihilistic, entertaining alternative candidate, as a cartoon, might be manipulated by shadowy powers that be. None end happily, but that is no spoiler, only true to life.

Tuesday, August 26, 2014

William T. Vollmann's "Poor People": Book Review

For an author as prolific as Vollmann, this is a short book on a vast topic. Chapters heighten the focus of his travels and interviews--often as he credits to interpreters, acknowledging the difficulty of getting to the nuanced or deflected truths told to him-- as he tries, living on $100 daily while his subjects must scrabble fractions of that, to figure out why a few are rich and most of the rest remain poor. They may blame karma, tuition, the rich, Allah, or themselves. Many claim they aren't poor compared to, well, what always seem to be people still worse off.

Vollmann admits his hubris, but here unlike his previous journalism, he steers clearer of the "drug addicts, street prostitutes, and criminals" to listen to more ordinary dwellers at the bottom rungs. He realizes he makes his living off of their stories, and he can grate or pose as if naive, but how else can we listen to those invariably so distanced from us? "Steinbeck did his homework. This is why The Grapes of Wrath is not only "universal," as any vague emotional overflow can be, but accurately particular." (xiii)

By particulars, Vollmann attempts to pin down the mindset of the poor within their own habitats. "People who are poor but not in imminent danger of perishing have more of a chance of catching their breath and actually conceptualizing their poverty." (xv) Do they respond well to his presence?

Given his interest in the Marxian "cash nexus" for gunrunners, migrants, and whores, Vollmann seems well-suited for this topic. He tries to elude the trap laid by patronizing or brutal intellectuals who try to raise the consciousness of those they claim to help. He defines in a prefatory dictionary a few terms, and the problem of how the poor themselves rank themselves as "normal" rather than poor leads to his frustration with "False Consciousness: A charge leveled against the perceptions and experiences of others whenever we wish to assert that we know their good better than they do." (xxi)

Vollmann maintains his slightly ironic authorial presence while stepping back and letting the interviewees have their say. He balances his editorial comments and his leading questions with their comments, or their gestures or refusals. "This deeply religious woman had never been inside the Cathedral of the Spilled Blood, since that would have cost money. But who knew its outside better than she?" (56) From 2005 Russia, this captures his eye for phrasing, and his own perspective, deftly.

Speaking of distancing, he wisely chooses to include his photos of those he talks to (and many staying silent, from his decades at the margins of the world) at the end of the volume, allowing us to "see" the people he interviews first by his verbal descriptions, rather than jump to conclusions or let our prejudices or sympathies interfere with what he wants us to focus on as he transcribes them. 

He emphasizes the agency that any humans possess; he will not condescend or place theory upon the reality. He dismisses the UN recommendation of "more aid, better directed," as admirable but of course, with a devil lurking in the details. He prefers to listen to the poor rather than speak for them. "Because I wish to respect poor people's perceptions and experiences, I refuse to say that I know their good better than they; accordingly, I further refuse to condescend to them with the pity that either pretends they have no choices at all, or else, worse yet, gilds their every choice with my benevolent approval. Once again I submit the obvious: Poor people deserve are no more and no less human than I; accordingly, they deserve to be judged and understood precisely as do I myself." (170) 

In 2002 Nan Ning, China, this sudden city confirms his interpreter Michelle's pride, and her dismissal of the excuses she has heard on Vollmann's behalf, for her own bargained salary daily. "Everything you should do by yourself, she replied sternly. You should not complain life is unfair to you. The history is the history!" The lack of quotation marks heightens Vollmann's ability to convey this tone.

Vollmann tells of his own workspace, an abandoned restaurant in Sacramento, and how the homeless surround him, to cajole or threaten, and how he and his daughter react to their presence. Echoes of earlier books endure, and readers of The Rifles (reviewed by me 2-2014) will recall his near-fatal encounter with a soggy sleeping bag in the Arctic when he muses: "Life is like an extended camping trip. With a leaky, inferior tent one runs no more risk of rain than anyone else; but if it does rain, the person in the cheap tent chances soaking his sleeping bag, and possibly dying of hypothermia." (137)

He conflates his travels with his residence, and he settles down to write behind a steel door at his stucco inner-city bunker. About the poor, "I shut my door on them, just as when we who are in first-class train compartments pull our glass doors shut to drown out the poorer sort in the corridors, who will be standing or leaning all the way across Romania; of course I'm doing them a favor." (276)

Chapters on Kazakh energy exploitation and Japanese "snakeheads" who smuggle from China girls for the sex trade feel imported from his journalism, and they lack the power of his more eclectically arranged sections. By contrast, "The Rider" although it too remains tangential to the theme, offers a gripping and lively look at a white man in the Philippines who ferries the take from jai alai betting.

Vollmann lags as the book goes on and fails to answer the question of why the poor are always with us. The book's brevity by his standards may betray how he can't offer any nostrums on how to solve what may persist as an endemic human flaw, the impulse to hoard, to compete, to fend off others with what we gather. "What can they do?" he asks of the poor. "Hope, accept, escape." (253) The shifting focus Vollmann prefers when speculating about poverty better captures the vagueness of this subject that entangles investigators: "money just goes to where it goes," shrugs a Japanese man in Vollmann's last pages, which seems to sum up this weary subject.  Not that there's not wit and irony to leaven the sour, sullen moods: see the first of Vollmann's many diligently documented end-sources: "Thoreau was interviewed by ouijah-board." (Amazon US 3-14-14)

Sunday, February 24, 2013

Richard Hathaway's "Zen Explained"

In 128 Kindle pages, this aligns with its aim: demystification and clarity, rational presentation of what's often occluded. Richard Hathaway favors a scientifically and psychologically enriched introduction that rewards today's Westerner seeking a no-nonsense approach. He takes the novel cognate "eu zên" in Aristotle's "living well" virtue ethics and shows how it compares (harmony, satisfaction, idealization) and contrasts (impermanent, elusive, unstable) with the Zen meaning.

Early on, he investigates the "checksum" parallel of two-signal computing, and decision making based on neural chemistry that is pre-cognitive or before volition, despite our tendency for our brain to shout over our impulses. Thoughts themselves are shown to be all we are: "if there are thoughts and we are aware of these thoughts, then what we are is that which is aware of thoughts, You and I; we are consciousness." Read this section and this will make more "sense" than my concision may present this intricate but accessibly conveyed food for thought.

As to our "apparently hard-wired propensity that people have to infer that entities with plans and intentions cause the things they observe around them," I needed more. Hathaway cites Stephen Pinker about this supposition that we create a "theory of mind" to attribute causality to someone (often a God to punish us), but this section was under-explained. He appropriately turns to Daniel Dennett regarding the ego as narrator, a character in our own work of fiction--we write not our autobiographies but our biographies, Hathaway avers. Our self-identity rests on our imagination.

Of improvement, no rational system can totally please the one looking for answers. Looking within ("know thyself" and the examined life) for answers may fool us. "We have made of ourselves the author, and the author knows if the story is over he or she is finished, out of a job. There must always be a new chapter to write." That impels us to strive for goals, progress, or achievement. What Zen counters: an end to such ideals. Instead, an acceptance of one's mortality, and the freedom from grasping to what will vanish or decay. "Unhappiness stems from not accepting life as it is and instead clinging on to an image of what we want it to be." Rather, Zen offers enlightenment from within, not from without "to walk a path of quite [sic] joy, of serenity and inner peace that is always underfoot, and, as walked in the present now, lasts and does not fade in the murk of the remembered past or anticipated future." This passage demonstrates the calm with which Hathaway conveys himself.

Despite this very Buddha-dharma perspective, the treatment's light on the message attributed to the Buddha. He keeps the Asian vocabulary to a minimum. Hathaway stresses rather Taoist influence in its depths as the teaching passed through China. He elides this (saying it can be looked up elsewhere), but emphasizes that "wu wei" or "do nothing/ going with the flow" fits better with the Dao's spirit than with its superficial gloss of dharma. Whatever its derivation, it's not a system but an attitude: Zen lets us let go of our own burden, as if waking from a nightmare to find we're safe in our own bed. Wu wei encourages us to act without will or intention, to kill the ego and to stop needless striving.

Yet, we cannot seek our own release. It's a Catch-22: we cannot aim for the target we want to hit. While his chapter "Not Catholicism" disappointed by its facile caricature of that faith as teaching that one can do whatever harm one wishes as long as confession absolves the sinner, and then it's back to dirty deeds, Hathaway tries to teach, if via that poorly chosen example, how Zen demands commitment without time off during the week: it's not as if one does one's duty once on Sunday.

Reading on, I understood slightly more why Hathaway may have stereotyped Catholicism: his passion, after a "kensho"-like experience that hit him one day in Portsmouth, England, changed him from a rational skeptic--apparently non-religious and very fact-oriented--to an advocate for Zen. That term's stripped here, notably, of "Buddhism" as common qualifier or accompaniment. "In Taoism, just as God is an invention we made up between ourselves to explain nature, so the SELF [he capitalizes this as EGO to show its dominance] is an illusion we have spun into existence to explain our inner nature to ourselves. Enlightenment is realising this is so."

While I would have liked more on Taoism's influence on a more purely anarchic (in the positive sense), liberating Zen, Hathaway reminds the reader to stop reading about it. "Don't believe in Zen. Don't intellectualise and rationalise it. That is anti-Zen. Experience Zen yourself, directly. Practise zazen. Be mindful. Just that. Only that." He goes on to observe how religions are "ex vivo" (out of the living") in that they affirm an afterlife or reincarnation; Zen remains "in vivo," tethered to the here and now, yet not bound by it within the ever-present, eternal moment. Out of its creative anarchy, its creative principle moves everything.

Tricky, as this expands into a challenging take on Zen's analogous affinity with quantum physics and our own creation of our own perceived universe. He lost me a bit with this partial koan: "the universe would exist only as a probability wave if there were not living beings around to make it real." I anticipated this might lead to Teilhard de Chardin's noosphere, and a few pages later, there it was. Later, Hathaway ties such a derivation to a link from ancient Greek for moral dimensions of Zen. This material proved rewarding, if for a small book too compressed at times to take in; with about a dozen typos, sometimes the casual style mixing with lofty concepts needed clarification and editing.

He concludes by encouraging us to take on Zen with the practical, experienced integration of it not as merely "dianoia" or book-learning, but "noesis." As a lived knowledge become understanding that goes beyond words, he promises that if we sit and we then practice mindfulness not as an activity but as within our spirit, the transformation will be telling, if beyond verbal expression: "Very soon all your questions will be answered." (Amazon US 1-23-13. I was provided a copy by the author; I found this a stimulating and provocative book worth reading.)

Sunday, January 27, 2013

"Travellers and Magicians": Film Review

As the first feature-length film from Bhutan, lama-director Khyentse Norbu's 2003 follow-up to his festival success of soccer-mad Tibetan monks in "The Cup" generates attention-- by that statement alone. What's to recommend for those curious? The previous twenty-six reviews sum up the modest, sincerely given "grass is greener" plot, as does the Amazon.com summation.

While the cast of this--also the first film in Dzongkha, the native language taught in schools there--is billed as non-professionals, I understand that the lead character of Dondup is the exception--as a radio actor. (As a relevant aside, I've reviewed in May, 2012, Jamie Zeppa's popular memoir of teaching in Bhutan, "Beneath the Sky and the Earth," and I believe that Dondup was the student with whom she as a young Canadian teacher fell in love.) In the film, Dondup's played by Tshewang Dendup, who has an appealing, long-haired raffish charm that fits his impatient, cocky, Westernized character who'd rather pick apples in America than eat one provided by the seller of the same from his basket, as they wait for a lift to the capital, Thimphu. He's told by the postmaster "things take time here," but he's eager to flee their remote village. Dondup wants to get out of Bhutan from Thimphu, while the apple seller, joined by a rice-paper maker and his (of course) sweet-faced daughter and a confident storytelling monk, wait to go to the capital to attend the "tsechu" grand festival.

It's a familiar frame: the varied cast hiking or hitching on the road hears a story along the way. The monk, strumming an admittedly handsome "dramyin," a dragon-headed six-string lute, passes the time with a fable about Tashi, a farmer's son who resents learning magic and longs similarly for escape. He meets the comely (of course) younger wife, Deki, of an cranky old shaman, Agay, in a storyline of a May-December marriage interrupted by a handsome stranger that "The Postman Always Rings Twice" or its Chinese adaptation "Ju Dou" dramatized.

The plot unfolds genially and gently. It's not fast-paced, and reflects the sensibility of its makers and actors. This isn't to romanticize, but it does depict Norbu's determination to offer the world and his own homeland a reflection of how Buddhist themes might enrich people, by cinema.

Some viewers complained about the ending. Without spoiling it, I felt this concluded as a short story would. It's more a literary or spiritual realization than a contrived epiphany or big, overwhelming climax. It pleased me as a more honest, if suggestive and not too tidy, final scene.

Meanwhile, the two stories of the travelers and the magician intertwine by editing and overlap. "Relax and enjoy the scenery," the monk advises his restless companion. The special effects show the perhaps limited budget, but they're respectable for an arthouse film, and while I actually wanted more of the landscape than what could be glimpsed largely by the side of the nation's only east-west road, the added feature on the DVD helps. I expected a greater panorama than the setting offers, although the film promotion stresses how difficult it was to make the film there.

Here, Norbu's ambitions as a Buddhist monk to channel "a painting of light" on film, and to craft a "modern-day 'thangka'" (an illustrated painted tapestry), to inspire his Bhutanese to make films that don't follow other nations, but lead them, gain explication. The way the fable points to Dondup's own realizations finds more elaboration in the commentary by the actors playing the monk and Dondup. This is the type of humbler film that does not stress the moral or everyday message; it may feel slower than you're used to. I recommend viewing its special feature afterwards, for it emphasized what (at least for a Westerner) might be too subtle to catch on a first viewing of "Travellers and Magicians." (Dharmaflix discussion with Norbu; Official site; YouTube. Review to Amazon US 11-28-12)

P.S. I found after viewing this that I'd already read the director's lively introduction (Apr. 2009 review) "What Makes You 'Not' a Buddhist" under his Buddhist name, Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche. See also Lesley Ann Patten's documentary about him, "Words of My Perfect Teacher" (reviewed by me Dec. 2012).

Tuesday, June 12, 2012

Owen Flanagan's "The Bodhisattva's Brain": Book Review

This philosopher from Duke applies neurobiology and psychology to "Buddhism naturalized": a way to achieve "eudaimonia" or a steady-state of ethical happiness (not the smiley-face touchy-feely blissed-out caricature) and flourishing in the moral sense of that term. Humans, Flanagan reasons, may benefit from adapting a secular approach stripped of gods, nirvana, and "superstitious nonsense." He wants to get beyond Buddhism as "mental hygiene" or "moral self-improvement" or, tellingly, "self-indulgence." He looks to its metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics as a natural philosophy.

He reminds us that "there are only Buddhisms, no Buddhism." (xii) Meditators in its Eastern societies tend to be fewer than Westerners suppose--they in turn are chided for often practicing meditation as the primary avenue to awakening without concentrating on the wisdom literature and study necessary, it seems in Flanagan's subtext, to achieve true insight. This may annoy readers, but Flanagan's point is that meditation in itself, disconnected from an ethical action or moral investigation leading to actualized improvement of one's self and others (however impermanent) has been too often left on its own as the "sine qua non" exercise by which the West defines a reductionist view of Buddhism. He compares this to how many Christians may pray without formally doing so during the day, or often at all. (See p. 106.) His main point is to show how mindfulness predominates among Eastern Buddhists.

He wishes to explore where brain chemistry intersects with meditation claims, and he finds less substance than what a decade or so ago he and his colleagues were attributed (by the media or some Buddhists) to have discovered as tangible evidence that happiness could be located on a brain scan, or that meditation led to such a steady state. Intriguingly, twice he in passing alludes to his surprise in meeting the Dalai Lama as to his apparent differences in how he regards reincarnation not in whatever "literal sense" can or cannot be aligned with "anatman," no-soul as contrasted maybe (Flanagan raises this elsewhere also in passing) as a flow of energies transferred from being to being. Unfortunately, at times Flanagan brings up such points so casually as asides that it frustrated me.

Owen Flanagan remains a skeptic, and in a fine section investigating the claims of the Dalai Lama (especially in "The Universe in a Single Atom" also reviewed by me) he compares and contrasts "karmic causality" with "the natural law of causation" in light of neo-Darwinian theory. This is challenging territory. A postscript calls this "an essay in Comparative Neurophilosophy." He concludes his attention to Buddhist epistemology by declaring that science will resist the attempts of those who say consciousness is an illusion or that choices are not made by sentient beings as agents. "There is no longer any need for bewilderment, befuddlement, or mysterianism from Buddhism or any other great spiritual tradition in the face of the overwhelming evidence that all experience takes place in our embodied nervous systems in the world, the natural world, the only world there is." (90)

Therefore, the inflated claims that at the turn of the millennium sprouted in the popular media as neuroscience was given a dubious credit for "proving" how Buddhist meditators demonstrated a happier cerebellum are debunked by a relentlessly empirical Flanagan. He insists, as an atheist and a rationalist, that any such claims be backed by proof that is not untestable, ungrounded, nor false. So far, consciousness appears to be physically based, and no leap into the ethereal for spiritual "proof" can convince his "naturalist" and materialist insistence.

Part two of this dense if brief study (it can be tough going as parts feel more like lecture notes than smooth prose for the uninitiated; many great insights are found relegated to endnotes) tackles Buddhism as a natural philosophy. He returns to the happiness question as he tries to advance the study of "eudaimonia" as a "condition for the possibility of happiness" directing us away from our "first nature" bent on our "untamed desires" towards a "second nature" akin to the Buddha's happiness as was taught by him and his followers, as "selfless persons" open to impermanence, to eliminating suffering as much as possible in the here and now, and to flourish free of delusion.

Accepting "no-self" impels us, in Flanagan's take on Buddhism, to be more kind and more compassionate, as we let guilt and anger go, and the delusion that such states define our identity in a fluctuating passage through formless time and space where we instead find a "metaphysic of morals." While Flanagan rushes past this-life nirvana vs. a post-mortem one, and his discussion of no-self might have been simplified with an earlier (he passes by it on p. 144 of 207 pp. of the main text) inclusion of conventional vs. ultimate truth-claims of existence that Buddhism makes, he segues into moral psychology and "fluxing" to give a helpful East-West comparison few studies have, by taking on scientific studies as well as philosophical explications.

Even if personhood is always changing, moral character traits for a no-self arise to spur happiness; this ontological and ethical connection Flanagan emphasizes as "eudaimonistic virtue theory." This chapter moved from basic to academically advanced discussions where Flanagan answers his peers regarding earlier cognitive research, and the shifts can be sudden. He sensibly compares and contrasts Aristotelian virtue theory (even if for Aristotle, our characters have staying power) to Buddhist solutions of how to live with "virtue, happiness, and flourishing," even if "anatman" is the real human state of no-self and emptiness ultimately comprises the nature of things. Qualifiers persist in this open-ended inquiry. Choosing the best projects to devote one's life to compassionately, unselfishly, and wisely appear to enhance long-term, if still this-life limited flourishing, in Flanagan's perspective.

His final chapter situates Buddhist happiness within liberal and classical "therapies of desire."  He addresses the Abhidhamma's classifications of the "three poisons" and how "wholesome" vs. "unwholesome" or "neutral" classifications of states of consciousness may spark insight into normative assessments made by philosophical Buddhist texts defining what we call phenomenology. He places Mill's utilitarianism and Jesus' Golden Rule next to Buddhist ethical recommendations for a similar style of impartial or universal ideal of compassion or loving-kindness. While Flanagan still finds Buddhist recommendations somewhat vague as to how much compassion, the bias when considering the "self-purified life of the arahant versus the active life of the bodhisattva" sums up the reason, perhaps, for the book's title. (Amazon US 4-23-12)

Wednesday, June 6, 2012

Karen Armstrong's "The Great Transformation": Book Review

I heard here the same sympathetic tones as her "Buddha" in the Penguin Lives series, which I reviewed 3/08 on Amazon US, or her short studies of Muhammad and Islam. I wanted to compare this to Robert Wright's "The Evolution of God," Rodney Stark's "Discovering God" and Nicholas Wade's "The Faith Instinct" (all reviewed by me in 2011): they explain the hard-wired or embedded models for religious evolution from varying perspectives of economics, markets, and the sciences.

Well, Armstrong does not base her study on any model other than a history of ideas one. Not by diffusion, not by memes, not by franchises, her ambitious survey links China, India, the Middle East, and Greece by a shared shift away from ritual and top-down imposition of belief into a gentler, kinder compassion emanating from self-criticism, introspection, responsibility, and carried into action stressing social justice and practical cooperation. Certainly, this echoes our own times with their progressive bent, and such scholars as Armstrong favor this slant, aimed at a broad audience.

As in her "History of God" and her works on the Buddha and Islam, she packs a lot of learning gleaned from solid research; she tends towards popularizing and summing up scholarship for a wider readership rather than pushing her own original insights. She also leans towards generous sympathy, as in her closing section on Islam. Wright, Stark, Wade advance their own theories more than she does. We need such hefty works as these to inform us of how ancient many ideas we search out in religious traditions today have been, and how often they are suppressed or compromised given the counter-trends (Wright tends to emphasize these) towards doctrinal conformity and social control by these world-shaking religious powers, allied with political clout. Bigotry, as she closes her book elegantly reminding us, can emanate from secular as well as religious fundamentalism. Instead, we all need to look inside ourselves, do right, and share responsibility. Armstrong stresses the turning away from violence and prejudice, and she seeks Karl Jasper's "a pause for liberty," non-violence, and the Golden Rule in her study of the Axial Age, extending here to encompass ca. 900-220 BCE.

She carefully narrates an immense amount of data and stories. Her strength lies in the vignettes that enable her to loosen up on the recital of names and dates, and to allow some room to look into mentalities. For instance, the Greek new wine festival in spring turns eerie in her depiction of Anthestera; Amos finds himself overtaken, not pleasantly, by the prophecy he channels of Yahweh; Psalm 82 shows the "kenosis" or emptying that prophets embodied to advance justice and which would be revived by Paul to promote Jesus' mission; Yajnavalkya's formulation of "karma" and "atman" enhance his simple lesson to his son of salty water; Plutarch's fragment #168 of the moments before death is compared with the loss of consciousness by the ecstatics (~"stepping out"): those caught up in the Eleusinian mysteries into "entheos"--"within is a God." (187)

I found myself less taken by the Chinese entries, but Mozi's logical, moral challenge to Confucian "family ties" as insufficiently transforming for a wider society and Zhuangzi's "Way of Heaven" earn notice. Eventually, that empire learned the virtues of syncretism and inclusion. Still, after so many warlords, enforced order, massacres, and contention, the Chinese chapters did not catch fire as often; they seemed grimmer than even the Homeric interludes full of fury, half-celebrating the warrior, half-hinting at the folly of such mortal combat compared to the wonders of a treasured earthly life. India's yogins and Samkhya gain wonderful exposition, and we glimpse how the Vedic tradition blurred into a breath meditation that appears to go back to very remote Aryan times.

So much is only glimpsed; as with the often shadowy Greek rituals, Armstrong tells what we can puzzle out, but the dots cannot always be connected given the lack of evidence, despite the diligence of her and her scholarly colleagues. But, as with the reformation by the Deuteronomists and biblical chroniclers during the Judean kingdom's success and the Assyrian and Babylonian incursions, what we have learned lately about the truth of how the Hebrew Scriptures came to be arranged to make Moses and the Exodus "backdated" for issues six hundred-odd years later in an embattled homeland,  makes for useful reading. So does the moral of Ashoka's good intentions to build a peaceable empire, the "bhakti" yoga renewal, or rabbinic Judaism's "profound reticence" in theology and mysticism.

Armstrong does not strive for a stirring turn of phrase; she prefers a steady exposition. Still, elegant moments linger. Of the renewal in the Holiness Code by the P-writer of scripture in exile: "Babylonia could be a new Eden, where God had walked with Adam in the cool of the evening." (181) "Aristotle had no ambition to leave Plato's cave." (327). Of the Buddha's shock at "four disturbing sights" before his awakening: "Once the suffering that is an inescapable part of the human condition has broken through the customary barricades that we have erected against it, we can never see the world in the same way again. Gotama had allowed the knowledge of 'dukkha' to invade his life, and his quest could begin." (275-6) Like Socrates or Confucius, the Buddha represents for Armstrong the paradigm of the Axial Age by "enhanced humanity"--he stood for an archetype of "a place apart" separate from but at one with our world. "Suffering shatters neat, rationalistic theology." (398)

A few spot-checked references puzzled me; I often consulted end citations. For instance, I cannot tell if Armstrong translated to use in her narration excerpts of the Pali texts for Buddhist sayings or if her "version" is taken from other renderings. She refers to the "nothing" definition of God by "later monotheists" via her "History of God" book but the note offers no pagination. She sums up Platonic absolute beauty as an eternal form well, yet (at least at first mention) she gives no textual context.

However, I gained knowledge from Armstrong's careful arrangement of vast material. Four-hundred pages, as dense as they can be for a topic meriting close attention, manage to compress information into an accessible overview for the patient inquirer. It's pitched at a reader who must be willing to ponder its elevated contents as well as absorb its perspectives. While it does of course leap between four settings during each of its thematic chapters, with not much discussion of why ideas erupted when they did, as opposed to what they were, mystery remains, perhaps appropriately for this elusive topic. It's not a facile presentation, and this only confirms its appeal for a reader who's open-minded (the original meaning of "skeptic," as she defines it). (Amazon US 4-27-12)

Sunday, May 27, 2012

Jonathan Green's "Murder in the High Himalaya": Book Review

Two months after a 17-year-old Tibetan nun was murdered by the Chinese police, this reporter for London's paper The Mail on Sunday followed her footsteps, and those of the 70 surviving refugees who made it across to Nepal in 2006. His coverage here sums up what became a fine account of what to my knowledge has not received attention before: the intersecting paths of mountain climbers from the West, who pay tens of thousands of dollars to scale Cho Oyu or Everest, and the desperate Tibetans attempting, under increasingly brutal conditions in their homeland and progressively more invasive surveillance by spies, technology, and soldiers, to find freedom on the other side of the Himalayas. Green writes movingly of the contrast between such climbers as famed guide Luis Benitez and the photographer Sergei Matei (who filmed some of the shootings of the refugees that his climbing party saw from a distance) and Dolma Palkyi, in exile now, the best friend of the murdered girl Kelsang Namtso.

I heard this story on an audiobook. William Hughes reads it fluently, with at least to my untutored ears an accurate rendition of the many Chinese and Tibetan names and places. His rendition keeps the slightly distant tone adopted by reporter Green, who strives to find out as much as he could despite a fearful tendency of the Chinese to suppress protest and squelch dissenters in the West not to mention the East. Yet, Hughes' voice and Green's style also strive to discover the conflicts beneath the initial press flurry of attention to this story.

Its comparative rarity lies in the fact it's the first time since the Dalai Lama's flight in 1959 during the Chinese conquest that documentation has existed of a murder by the communists. As Matteo Pistono has revealed in his own eloquent book, "In the Shadow of the Buddha", getting out hard evidence of atrocities from Tibet is next to impossible. Both sides engage in propaganda, and hearsay inflates the real suffering perpetrated. As Green himself is told by the Dalai Lama when he visits him in Dharamsala, the need to stay "honest" is difficult advice to follow when telling of Tibet.

Lots about Tibet is interspersed with mountaineering and Everest-variety lore, and while to me this was integrated well, it does demand close attention as the points of view shift between Benitez and climbers, historical background, and the lives of Dolma and Kelsang and their band of escapees. Green, in the penultimate section of this necessarily expansive book, delves (for me too briefly but this may be due to Chinese spin doctoring at home and abroad of pro-Tibetan voices in print and online) into how complicated the whole issue has become. What the East denounces as feudalism and the West often romanticizes in Tibet clash with the political ramifications and economic realities of a superpower determined to crush dissent and to, in the times during and after the 2008 Olympics, to squelch the truth. Small wonder, Green finds the Dalai Lama bursting out into anger as he laments how the death of Kelsang represents the true face of Chinese power, and how we in the West acquiesce as readily as did the mountaineers (who symbolize perhaps this accommodation) to favor.

Green considers, near the end of his narrative, how the Romanian photographer's choice to document the killing that suddenly erupted below the slope came from his awareness of oppression under totalitarianism, and how to him, freedom meant more than personal security or safety. Yet this same bold individual tells in the presence of his own meeting with the Dalai Lama a markedly off-color phrase to show how his photos and video "embarrassed" the Chinese! Green to his credit keeps his own objectivity, even as he naturally cheers on the choices of the Westerners who felt, finally, they had to tell the world what the majority of the climbers did not want to reveal about Kelsang's death.

Benitez, an American guide, contended with his own reputation as a driven, perhaps self-aggrandizing (to his many critics among fellow climbers, a contentious lot) Westerner, torn between the love of the mountains and his duty, reluctantly and imperfectly realized, to tell the world what he and his clients (who felt they could have done nothing and did not want to anger their Chinese upon whom they depended for permits and access and patronage by bribes) had seen. Dolma in India finds herself, along with many refugees, ironically comparing the more modern Lhasa (under relentless colonization by the incoming Han Chinese and tourism now by rail) with the backward conditions of her asylum in India, even if she is nearer the Dalai Lama whom she and her companions had longed to meet. No one here seems to have found a truly happy ending.

I cannot help but compare what I and billions heard about the Olympics against what I never heard in 2008 about this one woman's murder from afar at the Nangpa La pass. The imbalance, despite Green's commendable work, grows more and more against Tibet and on the side of a Maoist Nepal all too willing to support its watchful neighbor, the dominant and implacable China. One closes this thought-provoking, ambitious, and ethically relevant book soberly. (Amazon US 4-20-12)

Monday, February 27, 2012

Mary Lou & Robert J. Heiss' "The Story of Tea": Book Review

Like the tango and ta-chi, tea brewing is practiced but never perfected. So the authors opine. They combine a "cultural history" with "drinking guide," though much more of the former than the latter in regards to particular varietals. The Heisses have sold tea since 1974, and this narrative shines with their travel accounts to Asia on the tea trail. Not only China and India, but descriptions of Taiwan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal gain color and verve when these regions enter their survey. Types are told of, and the many varietals of yellow, pu-erh, and white teas add comprehensive coverage along with the venerable black, green, and oolong categories.

This six-tea strategy affords the Heiss's book more expansion, and part of the inherent interest in reading this handsomely designed, large-format volume is its attention to sidebars with highlights from their visits, and notes on tea culture and particular sights or events associated with tea's globalized impacts. This is a fit companion for those who liked Beatrice Hohenegger's historical account (see my review) of Eastern heritage, Western trends, and ethical and ecological concerns, "Liquid Jade," as the Heisses explore similar terrain, if much more the Asian cultural legacy than the European continuity and transformation of tea. Still, both books research the fair trade, organic, and moral considerations well, and compliment each other.

Similarly, John Blofeld's assured if more reflective "The Chinese Art of Tea" (see my review) makes a suitable match, although writing two decades later, the Heisses possess the advantage of up-to-date chapters on places such as Vietnam, Korea, Indonesia, and African nations where the manufacture of tea has boomed recently, or is trying to make a comeback after political unrest or war has interfered with progress. As skilled observers and merchants, they pay attention to the ups and downs of tea quality in various lands, and remind us of tea's variability as in wine, depending on "terroir" and year and climate and happenstance.

The health benefits of tea are less trumpeted due to recent and conflicting reports about antioxidents and catechins and often inflated, apparently, claims made. The authors reason it's better for now to take tea as a "tonic" and not regard it as a "curative." If any side effects boost health, all the better.

Naturally, CTC is downgraded and orthodox methods boosted, as this book means to inform you about the quality an affordable--if not dirt-cheap in nearly the literal sense of the term for "dust" and many teabags--loose-leaf tea offers. Tea-balls, we find, are discouraged, and a list of providers in cities and online steers consumers to better outlets for wiser purchases. The authors make a convincing case for buying better tea that promotes worker and ecological sustainability, and which ensures the hard work of its humble producers finds moral and financial recompense in a market that keeps pushing down prices even as consumers in the West begin to demand, here and there, more attention to how tea is made morally and not only as a bargain.

It's readable, leisurely in parts if somewhat uneven. Overall, an efficiently presented overview and in-depth guide, depending on the topic. One chapter's too-brief an encyclopedia with photos of cups filled with thirty-two or so brews and a list of their qualities. One problem is that the ratings used for Ceylon and India teas, with their strings of letters appended, get a chart, but not real elaboration. They are included in the sampler chapter under black teas, but this is not enough to show how they differ, and how they taste different.

While I wanted much more of the encyclopedia's sampler of a few types, I understand a subsequent book "The Tea Enthusiast's Handbook") by the couple has appeared, so this may answer my expectation for more choices. (However, I am unsure if this newer handbook boils down what's elaborated here, or refines or builds on it; at two-hundred pages it's half the length, much smaller than this elegant, cookbook-sized reference work.) [Posted at Amazon US 2-10-12]

Thursday, January 5, 2012

Keith Kachtick's "Hungry Ghost: A Novel": Review

A dissolute photographer, well-meaning but wayward, almost forty, falls for a Catholic convert thirteen years younger who's determined to save herself for marriage. Carter Cox's travels take him to shoot glamorous models worldwide for upscale magazines and ads that mirror his own conspicuous consumption in his Manhattan apartment. But--as the title shows with its Buddhist reference to the realm where unsatisfied "pretas" must wander until they gain liberation when they realize that their parched, greedy, tormented existence is an illusion--Cox's own journey will take him for his latest assignment to Morocco, and there, he and his new companion, Mia Malone, confront the meaning of their existence.

Kachtick brings ambition and range into this narrative, as Carter integrates, half-successfully, his growing commitment to Buddhism with his louche bedding of more women in his thirties than the time Mia's been kissed. We find this and all information conveyed in a daring, and initially off-putting, voice in the second person. Carter's taken this on "to fully disassociate" awareness "from the obstructing, lower-self 'I' that thinks in terms of 'me' and 'mine' and 'may I unbutton your blouse now, please?'" (14)

He attempts to desire to be without desire, and this telling of his tale as he tries to overcome his passions shows how he fails, and how he succeeds, in a book combining character studies with adventure, and social commentary with spirituality. This narrative voice, we later find, is the omniscient one we readers recognize, but with a deepened dimension I will leave you to discover.(I found a similar approach in Wilton Barnhardt's novel "Gospel" years ago, and it works as well here as it did there.)

Because of and not in spite of Carter's weaknesses, I cringed at and cheered him on, as a caddish fop, but also a struggling dharma practitioner, engaging with Mia's own formidable belief system. (Even if she claims to volunteer with a "Jesuit nun," inaccurately.) He grew up wondering what many may in a rather worldly, vaguely Christian upbringing: "Where was I before I was born? Why does my body feel like a guest house?" (51) He meets Mia at a Tibetan retreat at a former Catholic monastery upstate. She "possesses the milky-white skin and praying mantis beauty of someone who haunts museum archives and listens to Chopin while baking bread." (65)

Kachtick has a challenge in giving us a twenty-six year-old determined to wait for Mr. Right. She regards sex as sacred, so much that it is worth the wait to make it a sacrament. She disagrees with what she regards as a Buddhist contempt for the world and the flesh: "The work of heaven is material, the work of hell is entirely spiritual." (83) She then bums one of Carter's cigarettes, a sign of her own links to the body. They debate their differences and find similarities. They discuss Thomas Aquinas, cite Thomas Merton, and mull over St. Francis. Then, they make out. "She can't decide whether God has sent you into her life as a test or a gift." (88)

The tension within Carter goes beyond the bedroom, as he courts Mia, to a degree, while after she goes back to school, he beds others more compliant, if less intriguing. Later, as his Morocco jaunt brings him and her into conflict over their relationship, he reflects: "You'd long fancied yourself as a talented juggler of pleasure and ethics" (216)-- but this balancing act fails, as he must face what his teacher, Christopher Wolf (a skillfully depicted, poignantly captured character), warns him of: for bachelors perhaps in particular, the abyss where middle-aged lust leads into fear.

As the Buddha taught, drinking saltwater never quenches one's thirst. Whether in a New York City nightclub or binging on Entenmann's cookies, prowling for porn DVDs or amassing more gadgets, seducing tourists in Mexico or dealing with a temperamental model or vain windsurfer on a shoot, Carter faces his demons, even if disguised as long-legged angels: "you're like an alcoholic who punishes himself by drinking more." (232)

The novel takes a daringly imaginative twist. I feared Kachtick would let me down, but he does a deft fake-out and save and he pivoted gracefully, in more ways than one. If you lack a grounding in Buddhism, some of this novel may stall, but as a committed Buddhist himself, Kachtick's trying to merge his own compassion into a novel that entertains and instructs. He may switch to the former mode, almost as in a script made for Hollywood, later on, as if to make up for the earlier discussions that Mia or his teacher, Christopher, have, but for a thoughtful story that demonstrates right and wrong in scenes that take place in the bedroom or bar as well as on retreat or in meditation, this fairly conveys what a modern urban seeker, Catholic or Buddhist, may face when testing their faith against their works. Kachtick wants a wide audience for this novel, so he accommodates all these elements.

I will leave it for a reader to discover where the plot roams as Mia and Carter arrive in Morocco. The second half accelerates, and the pace moves rapidly. Conflicts thicken as the spiritual collides with the social, the Third with the First World.

Kachtick's to be commended for his energy and his range, and with Christopher as well as Mia and Carter, he creates characters you care about, no matter their own weaknesses, which endear them more rather than make them contemptible. He makes out of our urban, unhinged, dehumanized, web-obsessed, consumer-driven, sex-and-drug-and-media hookups a tale of morals and choices as profound as that of Henry James, if far more fun for me to read, as it's branded in the latest (as of 2002!) fashions, gizmos, and labels. (Posted to Amazon US & Lunch.com 3-6-11. See review by my friend Tony Bailie on his "Ecopunks"blog. )