Showing posts with label Daniel Dennett. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Daniel Dennett. Show all posts

Saturday, January 6, 2018

David Bentley Hart's "The Experience of God": Book Review

December | 2013 | "Sublunary Sublime"
I found out about David Bentley Hart from a review of his 2018 translation into blunt English of the clunky Greek often expressed in the New Testament. His acerbic reputation against "The New Atheists" as well as other thinkers who cross his sylvan path intrigued rather than dissuaded me, and I checked this out. This 2013 book is not a work of apolegetics, and not a defense of the proofs of God's existence. Instead, The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss applies what the Hindu labeled as sat, chit, and ananda to assert the non-contingent, ultimate, and transcendant force that many call one God. He encourages skeptics and naysayers to at least take seriously the truth of what a God outside of as well as permeating all creation means, as opposed to the childish notions of a fussy judge noting what's naughty or nice, or an addled fundamentalist's blinkered creationism.

Beginning each part with a moving, eloquent analogy of a dreamer imagining what occurs parallel to what's actually happening outside his sleep, which is filtered into his sensorium as transformed, sets up a main text demanding attention, widening one's vocabulary, and presuming philosophical insight.

Therefore it may prove daunting to many, believer, seeker, denier, or wanderer. It could have been shorter. The "pleonastic fallacy" Hart often decries in his opponents' claims--too many words--enters these three-hundred-plus pages frequently, as the author shares this weakness. He digresses, and then catches himself over and over. Much of this resembles a sage's ruminations to an erudite fellowship.

I wonder who's the target demographic for this Yale UP publication. It'll never get the notoriety of bestsellers by his detractors, nor will it entice many believers unable to handle his dense forays into the history of ideas and the shape of theology which have enriched and warped this perennial theme.

I come to this matter as a fence-sitter, and I aver it's rewarding to hear out both sides in this long debate. How it may be settled may defy the evolutionary biology Hart detests, and the defections of many of the formerly faithful, or, who knows, the final secret may be found, against all logic or odds. Hart counters that God outside of the cosmos, the sole non-contigent presence in the universe, can never be satisfactorily understood by the nature of our limitations within our human mind and body.

However, Hart dismisses the "Just-So Stories" of the adherents to a reductionist materialism in a manner which tempts a mirror image of a empiricist who wonders how God can be grasped if essentially and existentially beyond the reach of human comprehension, as equally (?) intangible.
I am unsure how this argument will convince any who reject the simpler notions of a creator God similar to the "watchmaker" metaphor, or how "magic" ex nihilo which is never "quite" nothing itself can substitute for the discarded divinity, for "naturism" might be swapped for "belief" in crude terms.

Yet the value of the notes, and the help of his annotated list of further reading is welcome. He praises the atheist J.K. Mackie's work as a worthy foil; he recommends John Lennox's God's Undertaker: Has Science Buried God? as a primer to many topics overlapping with his own deeper examination.

I share some highlights, for in such a challenging project, Hart's own words deserve their place rather than paraphrase or summary which may distort his patterns of inquiry or dilute his concentrated prose. At its best, it will inspire many bookmarks and times for an attentive reader to reflect upon. Its shortcomings remain, and will be countered surely by his eager rivals, but it's a valuable investment in one's time, and I found myself staying up more than one night, curious about what came next.

"The human longing for God or the transcendent runs very deep—perhaps far too deep to be trusted, but also too deep to treat as mere primitive folly—and it has produced much good and much evil in human history. It lies at the heart of all human culture. All civilizations to this point have grown up around one or another sacred vision of the cosmos, which has provided a spiritual environment and a vital impulse for the arts, philosophy, law, public institutions, cultural revolutions, and so on. Whether there will ever be such a thing as a genuinely secular civilization—not a mere secular society, but a true civilization, entirely founded upon secular principles—is yet to be seen. What is certain is that, to this point, most of the unquestionably sublime achievements of the human intellect and imagination have arisen in worlds shaped by some vision of transcendent truth. Only a thoughtless person can possibly imagine that the vast majority of those responsible for such achievements have all clung pathetically to an understanding of the transcendent as barbarously absurd as the one casually presumed in the current texts of popular unbelief. We really ought to put such things away and discuss these matters like adults." What may escape notice is that Hart never tries to use his theories to prove a particular God or religious revelation. It's refreshing to find a non-Christocentric approach. He admits that God after all may not be founded on what we surmise as outside our sensorium, too. This appears to challenge his thesis, to say the least, but I may have missed some sly subtlety here.

"From the perspective of classical metaphysics, Hawking misses the whole point of talk of creation: God would be just as necessary even if all that existed were a collection of physical laws and quantum states, from which no ordered universe had ever arisen; for neither those laws nor those states could exist of themselves." Hart likes to go at the cosmologists who reckon that the quantum foam and random wave fluctuations from a vacuum spontaneously coming in and out of reality have always been there, prior to the Big Bang. He hammers home the simple denial that these are still created. I wondered why an eternal, recurring universe or set of such might be calmly suggested. But although Hart nods briefly to Buddhist contexts, he does not delve into their supposition. I was also disappointed that other Eastern concepts such as Dao did not enter this endeavor. He makes an aside early on that they may apply, but he will not incorporate or remove them from his central emphasis.

"And my final reason for using precisely these three words {of the subtitle} is that, so it seems to me, they perfectly designate those regions of human experience that cannot really be accounted for within the framework of philosophical naturalism without considerable contortions of reasoning and valiant revisions of common sense. They name essential and perennial mysteries that, no matter how we may try to reduce them to purely natural phenomena, resolutely resist our efforts to do so, and continue to point beyond themselves to what is 'more than nature.' Hart here shows his opposition to naturalism.

"Even if one could conceivably prove, as is occasionally suggested these days, that cosmic information is somehow ceaselessly generated out of quantum states, this still would not have decided the issue of causality in favor of the naturalist position. As a brilliant physicist friend of mine often and somewhat tiresomely likes to insist, 'chaos' could not produce laws unless it were already governed by laws." Mentioned above, this estimation refuses to accept any "eternal" possibility.

"To use an old terminology, every finite thing is the union of an essence (its 'what it is') with a unique existence (its 'that it is'), each of which is utterly impotent to explain the other, or to explain itself for that matter, and neither of which can ever be wholly or permanently possessed by anything. One knows of oneself, for instance, that every instant of one’s existence is only a partial realization of what one is, achieved by surrendering the past to the future in the vanishing and infinitesimal interval of the present. Both one’s essence and one’s existence come from elsewhere—from the past and the future, from the surrounding universe and whatever it may depend upon, in a chain of causal dependencies reaching backward and forward and upward and downward—and one receives them both not as possessions secured within some absolute state of being but as evanescent gifts only briefly grasped within the ontological indigence of becoming." The "how" of the universe may be ascertained, but not the "why." That remains inaccessible to any discovery or test made by science.

Likewise, Hart gives no credence to the "strategy of avoiding the word 'God' only by periphrastically substituting the word 'universe.' In the end, ontological necessity is not a property that can intelligibly attach to any nature other than God’s. If one wishes to view the physical universe as the ultimate reality—whether one imagines it as having no beginning or as having a beginning without cause—then one must also accept that it is still an entirely contingent reality, one which somehow just happens to be there: an 'absolute contingency,' to use an unavoidable oxymoron. It may be an absurd picture of things—certainly there seems to be no argument against it more potent than its own perfectly self-evident incoherence—but it seems to me to be an absurdity that one can quite blamelessly embrace so long as one is willing to grasp the nettle and accept that this just-there-ness is logically indistinguishable from magic. Everyone needs a little magic in life now and then." Surprise!

"God is the infinite 'ocean of being' while creatures are finite vessels containing existence only in limited measure." Hart holds this is a frequently used image in spiritual works, but it's new to me.

"At that uncrossable intellectual threshold, religions fall back upon inscrutable doctrines, philosophers upon inadequate concepts, and mystics upon silence. 'Si comprehendis, non est deus,' as Augustine says: 'If you comprehend it, it is not God.'" So, what surpasses commonsense or speculation therefore comprises that which we cannot comprehend, but nonetheless, we by our senses say this? This reminds me of Thomas Aquinas' bow to mysticism, for all his texts were but "straw."

"The first-person perspective is not dissoluble into a third-person narrative of reality; consciousness cannot be satisfactorily reduced to physics without subtracting something." Hart doggedly insists that we can never get outside our own heads to truly explore the mystery of what our consciousness "is."

"What, precisely, did nature select for survival, and at what point was the qualitative difference between brute physical causality and unified intentional subjectivity vanquished? And how can that transition fail to have been an essentially magical one?" He nags at the biologists who aver that evolution can account fully for these leaps from animal to human within the evidence of the record.

"My claim throughout these pages is that the grammar for our thinking about the transcendent is given to us in the immanent, in the most humbly ordinary and familiar experiences of reality; in the case of our experience of consciousness, however, the familiarity can easily overwhelm our sense of the essential mystery. There is no meaningful distinction between the subject and the object of experience here, and so the mystery is hidden by its own ubiquity." God surrounds, if to us routine?

"If one is to exclude the supernatural absolutely from one’s picture of reality, one must not only ignore the mystery of being but also refuse to grant that consciousness could possibly be what it self-evidently is." Tricky. I guess that he reiterates the hard fact that we cannot figure out our own mind.

"The vanishing point of the mind’s inner coherence and simplicity is met by the vanishing point of the world’s highest values; the gaze of the apperceptive 'I' within is turned toward a transcendental 'that' forever beyond; and mental experience, of the self or of the world outside the self, takes shape in the relation between these two 'supernatural' poles." Within the book, this passage gains support. Maybe, that horizon is where God lurks, and where morals and what we yearn for rests by design.

"God is the one act of being, consciousness, and bliss in whom everything lives and moves and has its being; and so the only way to know the truth of things is, necessarily, the way of bliss." Late in the book, Hart tells us that without God, neither good nor evil would be present among us. I admit I remained unclear about this bold statement. Perhaps it's that God generates all that "matters" even if as conceived as mental constructions (aesthetics, love, truth, goodness?) rather than evolution itself?
Sometimes I felt as if Hart was hacking his way into thickets determined to strike down the biologists who advance the primacy of these "moral" conceptions as generated from our inner workings. He kept cutting down Daniel Dennett, for instance, but I wished he'd given his foe more of a fair hearing.

"Whether God is indeed to be found in these dimensions of experience, that is where he has traditionally been sought, as the unconditioned and transcendent reality who sustains all things in being, the one in whom all that nature cannot contain but upon which nature depends has its simple and infinite actuality." Hart encapsulates the central gist of his formidable repetition of this verity.

"We cannot encounter the world without encountering at the same time the being of the world, which is a mystery that can never be dispelled by any physical explanation of reality, inasmuch as it is a mystery logically prior to and in excess of the physical order." Hart repeats his immaterial worldview.

So "much of what passes for debate between theist and atheist factions today is really only a disagreement between differing perspectives within a single post-Christian and effectively atheist understanding of the universe. Nature for most of us now is merely an immense machine, either produced by a demiurge (a cosmic magician) or somehow just existing of itself, as an independent contingency (a magical cosmos)." Back to that magic he mocks in the materialists as the only fallback they have for the evolutionary leaps. A bit of the "god of the gaps" inverted against the fact-checkers.

"It is rather as if a dispute over the question of Tolstoy’s existence were to be prosecuted by various factions trying to find him among the characters in Anna Karenina, and arguing about which chapters might contain evidence of his agency (all the while contemptuously ignoring anyone making the preposterous or meaningless assertion that Tolstoy does not exist at all as a discrete object or agent within the world of the novel, not even at the very beginning of the plot, and yet is wholly present in its every part as the source and rationale of its existence)."" I liked this all the more as I just finished that novel. It assists those of us who at this rarified level of cogitation wait for an easier sussed idea.

He turns Marx inside out a bit next. "In our time, to strike a lapidary phrase, irreligion is the opiate of the bourgeoisie, the sigh of the oppressed ego, the heart of a world filled with tantalizing toys." He's getting warmed up at the conclusion, encouraging contemplation to get beyond all this mental exertion, and warning us that without such committed endeavor, these distractions will dull us, and we will fail to make the necessary attempt to turn from the shadows and leave Plato's screened cave.

"If one is left unsatisfied by the logical arguments for belief in God, and instead insists upon some 'experimental' or 'empirical' demonstration, then one ought to be willing to attempt the sort of investigations necessary to achieve any sort of real certainty regarding a reality that is nothing less than the infinite coincidence of absolute being, consciousness, and bliss. In short, one must pray."

"Late modernity is, after all, a remarkably shrill and glaring reality, a dazzling chaos of the beguilingly trivial and terrifyingly atrocious, a world of ubiquitous mass media and constant interruption, a ceaseless storm of artificial sensations and appetites, an interminable spectacle whose only unifying theme is the imperative to acquire and spend. It is scarcely surprising, in such a world, amid so many distractions, and so many distractions from distraction, that we should have little time to reflect upon the mystery that manifests itself not as a thing among other things, but as the silent event of being itself. Human beings have never before lived lives so remote from nature, or been more insensible to the enigma it embodies. For late modern peoples, God has become ever more a myth, but so in a sense has the world; and there probably is no way of living in real communion with one but not the other." Preaching to me, a disenchanted and disaffected member of the late capitalist choir, this concludes Hart's spirited counter-cultural turn, where he encourages us to stay still. Few of us may have the privilege he does to live in hilly woods, but we can seek a better place to reflect.
(Amazon US 1/5/18 in much shorter form)

Tuesday, December 5, 2017

Tim Crane's "The Meaning of Belief": Book Review


The "New Atheists" get it wrong about religious perpetuation, argues this philosopher, an atheist himself. Tim Crane rejects basing opposition to faith claims and belief systems primarily on bald evidence of their irrationality. This default stance characterizes non-believers such as Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, A.C. Grayling, and Daniel Dennett who aver that if mass ignorance and dogmas were corrected by science and logic, these newly enlightened billions would, dazzled by the glow of reason, disavow delusion. For, if 8 out of 10 among us affirm a God or gods, why in this advanced era have not more been convinced of the error of their benighted, superstitious, and unverifiable suppositions?

So Crane begins this brief book, The Meaning of Belief: Religion from an Atheist's Point of View. Based on his 2007 lecture which failed to sway his London academic audience away from a rote response centered on what Crane regards as an over-exaggeration of blaming the world's problems on religion as the root cause for every evil, this professor ten years later has refined his subtle message that tolerance better addresses religion today, and that this denotes neither its approval nor its affirmation.

He counters New Atheist objections with two observations. Religion combines much more than a system grounded in a cosmological construction of a powerful deity ruling the universe. It embeds two crucial needs which many humans have long sought and will continue to seek. First, the impulse for "more to it all than just this" motivates a religious quest. Second, this search offers inspirational enrichment in the historical legacy of a faith, expressed through ritual and tradition. Crane defines religion four ways. It's systematic, practical, a search for meaning, and an appeal to the transcendent.

Religion aligns humans with "a collection of ideas and practices" designed to match a particular worldview. Over six billion believers in Crane's estimation do not grovel before supernatural agents as their predominant concern. Rather, religion in their quotidian routines connects one's practice with a stable and supportive community. This is central, not peripheral, contrasted with a New Atheist critique which elevates the supernatural as if this occupies the majority of a believer's daily devotion.

Crane warns that his inversion of categories does not presume their truth. He strives to show how religion contains content which atheists tend to demote in their rush to convince duped believers. Given the faithful have not been swayed in significant numbers by the New Atheists, Crane asserts that believers do not recognize themselves within those depictions popularized by their detractors.

Delving deeper into impulse, Crane determines that people long for a meaning which will outlast their own mortality. This rests in a divine presence. Pessimists, of which Crane is one, admit if tacitly that if an "unseen power" (using William James' formulation from his pioneering work in the classification of experiences) could be verified, that disenchantment and meaninglessness would be replaced; the foes would become comrades in faith. Optimists dismiss enchantment itself as possible.

They reject "even the possibility that God's existence could give the world meaning." Crane, speaking for the former faction, considers the persistence of a "religious temperament" without one's belief. This is balanced by adherents who, as do many Christians and Jews nowadays, may participate in actions and rites without a temperament inclined towards any faith itself. This does beg the question whether secular mores are accelerating this lack of a temperament, or whether those who formerly had to play along despite their true preferences may more freely express disbelief now. The challenge remains that belief by definition eludes our "full cognitive grasp" in words or images. This relates to theodicy--how a good God can exist alongside bad things--and the puzzle of creation by an eternal Creator, to name two venerable examples of puzzles which believers may confess they can't solve.

Scientific explanations rest on mathematics and laboratories; ordinary believers (not theologians) may lack education, or if they have it, Crane reminds us, few will pursue the higher study of what can be arcane knowledge and difficult data. They simply lack, again, any technical inclination. Their tolerance for "mystery and ignorance" is greater than a scientist's. They don't demand hypotheses or proofs. Not certainty so much as "continued struggle" occupies the mindset of many sophisticated believers more often than naysayers may imagine. Crane quotes Francis Spufford here in wise support. Facing the unknown and inexplicable, these faithful attempt to reconcile the explicit with that which cannot be explained in tangible form or clear articulation, but which nevertheless endures.

Identification with the wider system within which this impulse persists incorporates many situations not based on belief itself. Crane appears to find wiggle room here, but he tallies how but one of the Five Pillars of Islam and the Ten Commandments respectively state a cosmological claim of God's existence and dominance. Rather, pilgrimage, dietary rules, or circumcision exemplify the granular means by which a religious community continues. Crane cites Emile Durkheim's reminder that believers belong to a larger polity. This collective figures out who will be a member and how, and invents rituals to incorporate believers and sustain the system which codifies faith-claims tangibly.

For those who balk at this argument, Crane notes how without religion, a believer would indulge in only magic, which lacks any church. Akin somewhat to nationality, ethnicity, patriotism, family, and clan, humans establish manifestations of their common values and ties to their terrain and to one another. These endure; we belong to these categories without entering them by our rational choice.

Therefore, religion cannot be excised from our social order without leaving but a slight scar. Crane judges that the academy for scientists themselves reifies a similar set-up. Those who are convinced gather together to repeat cherished actions and to find solidarity in sophisticated networks and ranks.

The concept of the sacred connects impulse with identification. Objects possess an external significance in worship, but they also emanate an internal meaning directed towards transcendence. Illogical as a funeral rite may be when weighed against utility, Crane reflects, even an atheist might be moved by that moment. There's no logic why we place wreaths on a grave, but we bow to ritual.

The penultimate section of this text turns to the way pain and violence intrude upon everyday life. Religious institutions and groups of believers cause atrocities, Crane agrees. But he rejects the claim that they "have been in some way uniquely responsible for the worst horrors and evils of the human race." For "Stalinism, Nazism, and Maoism appeal to no spiritual agencies." He at some length, granted this short text, confronts those who would equate political ideologies with religious functions.

"Beliefs about God" do not align exactly with social uses or abuses of religion, Crane explains. Many supposedly religious conflicts "have little do to with any of the theological ideas that may have been responsible for the religious schism in the first place." This careful admission deserves attention. Crane cleanly cancels the canard promoted by both Dawkins and Hitchens which blames the conflict in the North of Ireland on ecclesiastical debates. The Croats and Serbs two decades ago were not fighting over the "filioque" clause about the Holy Spirit proceeding from both the Father and the Son which led to the Great Schism of 1054 between the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches. Such lofty disputes played no role. On the other hand, when the Ayatollah Khomeini issued a death sentence against Salman Rushdie, this documents the precise cause and effect of a doctrine and a harm.

In Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, and even the Thirty Years War, ethnic and territorial allegiances entangled with denominational affiliation and princely power plays subsumed any distinctively religious content, Crane determines. This little work could have generated more space to this matter, for it's key in rhetoric repeated by leading atheists and secularists, but he retreats to a philosophical consideration of "theoretical rationality, or reasons for belief," which displays his scholarly bent. He shows that without religion, as recent events verify, human irrationality endures apart from any faith.

Yet, as the revival of religions within contemporary China reveals, nationhood gathered up within faith systems confirms this pair as the "main drivers behind world events," rather than what the last century assumed, as the battles between "principles about state ownership and the economy." This statement elides the economic roles religion promotes, generates, and perpetuates, but Crane in his final chapter clears room for non-political analysis. He explains that his last pages will elucidate instead the logic behind a personal advocacy of tolerance by atheists towards religion. This is not an agreement with faith-claims or ritual actions. It does not capitulate to the "non-starter" of "anything goes" relativism, or a "wishy-washy respect" for all faiths (one conjures up apparitions of the post-9/11 "Co-Exist" bumper sticker ubiquitous in enclaves of the bien-pensant liberal constituency) which glosses over pain and cruelty exacted by the perpetuation of barbaric and nonsensical codes.

For disapproval may follow frequently wherever atheists live among believers. Not necessarily due to differing opinions or actions, Crane assures, but out of a moral imperative for a far more fundamental expression of mutual respect: that for each other as human. Non-believers may respect believers, while strenuously rejecting their views and their actions. Crane's first principle presents a common cause through a dignified expression of humanity, neither churlish nor condescending, towards faith. The Meaning of Belief prefers calm logic to bold catchphrases. It likely will not attract the attention given by supporters or detractors of the New Atheists' shelf of screeds, but it invites poised reaction.

Tim Crane wraps up this swift study (too much so in one parenthetical moment when Muhammad is said to have lived "around 600 BC") by repeating that his colleagues, the New Atheists, are too optimistic. That is, by their idealism that with the imposition of reason, faith will ebb away smoothly. As a realist and a pessimist, he reckons neither secularism nor religion will disappear anytime soon.
(PopMatters 12/5/17 in slightly ed. form; Amazon US 12/5/17)

Sunday, February 24, 2013

Richard Hathaway's "Zen Explained"

In 128 Kindle pages, this aligns with its aim: demystification and clarity, rational presentation of what's often occluded. Richard Hathaway favors a scientifically and psychologically enriched introduction that rewards today's Westerner seeking a no-nonsense approach. He takes the novel cognate "eu zên" in Aristotle's "living well" virtue ethics and shows how it compares (harmony, satisfaction, idealization) and contrasts (impermanent, elusive, unstable) with the Zen meaning.

Early on, he investigates the "checksum" parallel of two-signal computing, and decision making based on neural chemistry that is pre-cognitive or before volition, despite our tendency for our brain to shout over our impulses. Thoughts themselves are shown to be all we are: "if there are thoughts and we are aware of these thoughts, then what we are is that which is aware of thoughts, You and I; we are consciousness." Read this section and this will make more "sense" than my concision may present this intricate but accessibly conveyed food for thought.

As to our "apparently hard-wired propensity that people have to infer that entities with plans and intentions cause the things they observe around them," I needed more. Hathaway cites Stephen Pinker about this supposition that we create a "theory of mind" to attribute causality to someone (often a God to punish us), but this section was under-explained. He appropriately turns to Daniel Dennett regarding the ego as narrator, a character in our own work of fiction--we write not our autobiographies but our biographies, Hathaway avers. Our self-identity rests on our imagination.

Of improvement, no rational system can totally please the one looking for answers. Looking within ("know thyself" and the examined life) for answers may fool us. "We have made of ourselves the author, and the author knows if the story is over he or she is finished, out of a job. There must always be a new chapter to write." That impels us to strive for goals, progress, or achievement. What Zen counters: an end to such ideals. Instead, an acceptance of one's mortality, and the freedom from grasping to what will vanish or decay. "Unhappiness stems from not accepting life as it is and instead clinging on to an image of what we want it to be." Rather, Zen offers enlightenment from within, not from without "to walk a path of quite [sic] joy, of serenity and inner peace that is always underfoot, and, as walked in the present now, lasts and does not fade in the murk of the remembered past or anticipated future." This passage demonstrates the calm with which Hathaway conveys himself.

Despite this very Buddha-dharma perspective, the treatment's light on the message attributed to the Buddha. He keeps the Asian vocabulary to a minimum. Hathaway stresses rather Taoist influence in its depths as the teaching passed through China. He elides this (saying it can be looked up elsewhere), but emphasizes that "wu wei" or "do nothing/ going with the flow" fits better with the Dao's spirit than with its superficial gloss of dharma. Whatever its derivation, it's not a system but an attitude: Zen lets us let go of our own burden, as if waking from a nightmare to find we're safe in our own bed. Wu wei encourages us to act without will or intention, to kill the ego and to stop needless striving.

Yet, we cannot seek our own release. It's a Catch-22: we cannot aim for the target we want to hit. While his chapter "Not Catholicism" disappointed by its facile caricature of that faith as teaching that one can do whatever harm one wishes as long as confession absolves the sinner, and then it's back to dirty deeds, Hathaway tries to teach, if via that poorly chosen example, how Zen demands commitment without time off during the week: it's not as if one does one's duty once on Sunday.

Reading on, I understood slightly more why Hathaway may have stereotyped Catholicism: his passion, after a "kensho"-like experience that hit him one day in Portsmouth, England, changed him from a rational skeptic--apparently non-religious and very fact-oriented--to an advocate for Zen. That term's stripped here, notably, of "Buddhism" as common qualifier or accompaniment. "In Taoism, just as God is an invention we made up between ourselves to explain nature, so the SELF [he capitalizes this as EGO to show its dominance] is an illusion we have spun into existence to explain our inner nature to ourselves. Enlightenment is realising this is so."

While I would have liked more on Taoism's influence on a more purely anarchic (in the positive sense), liberating Zen, Hathaway reminds the reader to stop reading about it. "Don't believe in Zen. Don't intellectualise and rationalise it. That is anti-Zen. Experience Zen yourself, directly. Practise zazen. Be mindful. Just that. Only that." He goes on to observe how religions are "ex vivo" (out of the living") in that they affirm an afterlife or reincarnation; Zen remains "in vivo," tethered to the here and now, yet not bound by it within the ever-present, eternal moment. Out of its creative anarchy, its creative principle moves everything.

Tricky, as this expands into a challenging take on Zen's analogous affinity with quantum physics and our own creation of our own perceived universe. He lost me a bit with this partial koan: "the universe would exist only as a probability wave if there were not living beings around to make it real." I anticipated this might lead to Teilhard de Chardin's noosphere, and a few pages later, there it was. Later, Hathaway ties such a derivation to a link from ancient Greek for moral dimensions of Zen. This material proved rewarding, if for a small book too compressed at times to take in; with about a dozen typos, sometimes the casual style mixing with lofty concepts needed clarification and editing.

He concludes by encouraging us to take on Zen with the practical, experienced integration of it not as merely "dianoia" or book-learning, but "noesis." As a lived knowledge become understanding that goes beyond words, he promises that if we sit and we then practice mindfulness not as an activity but as within our spirit, the transformation will be telling, if beyond verbal expression: "Very soon all your questions will be answered." (Amazon US 1-23-13. I was provided a copy by the author; I found this a stimulating and provocative book worth reading.)

Friday, October 19, 2012

Daniel Dennett's "Breaking the Spell": Book Review

Every reader of this book needs to constantly keep in mind Dennett's reminders about his authorial attitude. On pg. 103, speaking of the three favorite purposes for religion (comfort, explaining, cooperating), he reminds us: "The main point of this book is to insist that we don't [italicized emphasis in original type] yet know--but we can discover--the answers to these important questions if we make a concerted effort." That is, questions about why these three purposes emerged, how they were diffused, and why these and not other ideas about religion's efficacy. "Probably some of the features of the story I tell will prove in due course to be mistaken." He stresses: "The purpose of trying to sketch a whole [italics in original] story now is to get something on the table that is both testable and worth testing." (103-4) As he says, so I concur: "Many people may wish that these were unanswerable questions. Let's see what happens when we defy their defensive pessimism and give it a try." (104)

Now, I as with anyone who has actually read all of this book (including endnotes and appendices), can cavil with some of his "sketch"--but like Jared Diamond's "Guns, Germs, and Steel," Dennett is giving us the big picture, not filling in the details. This does make for a very uneven survey.

If I could finesse my rating it'd be 3.65/5 stars at best. It could have been so much better if he took more time to polish his arrangement and explication. He wants to pour it all out right away on to paper, and the book for all its learning documented reads as if too rushed off to take advantage of the notoriety aroused by 2004's Sam Harris' "The End of Faith." Too often--in both books--chapters drift in and out of focus. Subtopics come up as in an intelligent conversation, but in permanent form (for both Harris & Dennett) more cohesion with the rest of the chapter is often woefully absent. Inevitable perhaps for popularizing books tackling for a wider audience an immense and subtle and rather intangible morass of belief, fact, and supposition. Dennett's engaging, even if he too thinks smugly from his tenured comforts and rarified perch that "brights" are smarter, better, and wiser than believers.

He also, I find, tends to assume brights are all atheist. Liberal Christians and progressive Jews, I suggest, share many of the "God as essence but not as being" tendencies that exposure to higher education (in or out of college) has given recent generations raised with notions of biblical 20c "higher criticism" or Mordecai Kaplan's "Judaism as a Civilization." He also gives but one bare mention in the entire book to even the word "agnostic." (Not to mention Buddhists and their own approach to the divine.) I think many of the topics here are mulled over also by agnostics and rationalists who still support culturally religious identities. Dennett seems to want to set off a binary atheist vs. believer standoff, but glosses over many millions (perhaps billions if more of us were honest with our own souls and selves?) who waver in between the two too easily polarized and stereotyped positions of faith vs. reason, assertion vs. evidence, secular vs. spiritual. Lots of us live in the middle.

I think too he takes easy potshots at those smart people who have chosen to place their trust in prayer--especially those in contemplative monastic orders, for example; his attempt to explain "ex nihilo" creation as if it came out of a substance nearly indistinguishable from nothing (a close paraphrase of his phrase) seems shaky when placed against those positing a prime mover or first cause: are not theists and scientists occupying the same ground (or lack of matter!) for argument here, when the names and labels are removed? But, Dennett's a good sport, and notes again with italics: "Assuming that these propositions are true without further research could lead to calamitous results." He wishes on pg. 311 this could be placed as a cautionary sticker on this book's cover: may I suggest this for the paperback edition?

His conclusions are about as commonsensical or as quixotic as those of Sam Harris' "The End of Faith" (also reviewed by me on Amazon): Harris urged idealistically that if only all parents told their children only the truth, the future could be secured for rationalists. Dennett too places his trust in the secular. That's about it for big answers. These are so simple, yet so elusive: do not many true believers of gods or God or no gods think exactly that? That we no matter what we preach have a handle on the truth, and that we mean best for our progeny as we raise them in the light of our own understanding; all the while, however, unable to step out of our own limited perspective of the universal and the eternal?

Dennett's devilishly entertaining, if a bit too enamored of his own cleverness. You need to imagine him on the first day of the term impishly riling up a class full of naive freshmen. He manages to make you think, although I personally was never shook up, let alone shocked, by what he had to say--despite his oft-repeated desire to ruffle (if not pluck out) all of our protective covering of faith-based feathers.

A savvy reader, in fact, will note that his book does not exactly disprove God/gods. Dennett's only asking why and how do many believe based on natural rather than supernatural explanations. A good counterpart: Randall Sullivan's "The Miracle Detectives," all about how the Vatican investigates the veracity of otherworldly visions and purported miracles. Like Dennett, Sullivan creates a readable, erratic, but thought-provoking account of how grownups in the early 21c can go about asking tough questions about faith-based suppositions and expect honest answers, or at least acknowledgements that none of us have all the answers. Both authors (like Harris, too, in another erratic but worthwhile screed) express refreshing caution in an era too in love with righteousness. Dennett's book makes a big splash, and gets our attention. From here, it's up to all challengers to take him on and support or qualify his initial rabble-rousing. He wakes us up. What will we do when jolted out of our spell?

His note #18 on pg 412 bears repeating: "(As all you careful readers know full well, I am an equal-opportunity teaser, who refuses to tiptoe around for fear of offending people--because I want to take the 'I'm mortally offended' card out of the game.) It will be interesting to see who, if anyone, falls into my trap. They won't be assiduous note readers, will they?" Caveat lector.

(Amazon US 5-12-06. As I wrote this before I started blogging, I figured it merited a reprise here.)

Friday, June 8, 2012

Keith Ward's "The Case for Religion": Book Review

Relying on Bronze Age verses to critique religion's essence is like analyzing astronomy through astrology, or chemistry by alchemy. So argues this Oxford professor of divinity. The paperback edition features a large heading on the cover telling how Ward confronts "Dawkins and the New Atheism." Basically, Ward protests his fellow Oxford colleague for relying on simplistic readings of scripture while ignoring theology; I found Ward somewhat stronger in challenging Dawkins rather than Dennett, but both are dispatched very hastily in a brief preface when another book might have better suited Ward to take on his opponents with the depth deserved.

To sum up, "superstitious vulgarity" too often has been assumed by scientific and secular critics as the highest (or lowest) level to which "a complex affective encounter with the being of the cosmos" might attain--not only for modern people but for our ancestors, who could have turned to the gods or God out of not fear and trembling but out of poetry, love, and understanding, however partial or half-formed. Ward presents an overview of the philosophy of religion. He considers not only familiar criticisms, but formulations by its adherents to build upon its visions for bettering humanity.

Whether genuine or a delusion, human efforts to call on a transcendental force to guide us, away from malign presences or towards benign outcomes, appear deeply enmeshed within cultures and peoples, however diverse or scattered in time and place. Instead of primitive, Ward substitutes primal as a telling adjective for the core basis upon which religions have been able to progress, and sometimes regress. He insists that the more we understand about the non-mechanical, non-rational, yet civilizing power within religion, the more we may be able "to unlock a perception of meaning and value in the cosmos, which is necessary for the realisation of full human cognitive potential." (33)

This study analyzes anthropological, political-economic, and psychological critiques; Ward's sharp on Marxist weaknesses which promote an idealized humanity while denigrating nearly all actual humans. He's pessimistic that any system basing its success on human transformation can succeed, given inherent weaknesses we share, but he reminds us how facile put-downs from liberal skeptics of religious possibilities for not reductive materialism but progressive expansion of social justice and equality may emerge from religion. He skims over a provocative assertion that liberals should not be blamed for injecting secularism into (post-?)modern biblical exegeses, when the shift towards progressive social aims can be found in post-Enlightenment trends within Christian interpretation.

Given the relative coverage afforded each topic, however, as the next section quickly takes in the major world religions, Ward's attention to so many myriad details may be limited. The short length of a book taking on so much leads to summation and asides that must speak for much more between the lines. Ward emphasizes a definition of religion open to the transcendental inherent within all times and places, and which, as Marxists found, could not be eradicated, only warped into mass idolatry and massive iconography. "Religion is a combination of a theoretical conception of reality and of claims to experience, and to participate in the power of a transcendent reality. This is a state of being which is other and greater in power than things in the world of space and time." (103)

The next section charts the cultural shift away from evidence asserted to experience examined. Reform led to critique. Pure reason gave way to free questioning of authoritative sources, scientifically and scripturally. Ward differentiates a scientific method from the "discernment" which may compel a believer to commit one's self, even if this "matter" cannot be proven empirically.

The modern skepticism we inherit leaves no room for revelation's claims, unable to be verified. "The intuitive reason of an atheist will not be identical with the intuitive reason of a Christian. One includes God as an axiom and apprehensions of the supernatural as data, where the other does not include either." (167) How to account not for divine dictation but inspiration via a divine presence? Not easy to answer, but Ward in the latter third of this study tries to figure it out.

Ward investigates Kant's endeavor to map out a more rational understanding of morality as a start. A surprising place, but Ward's past work on Kant affords a fresh examination of how truth-claims in religion can be analyzed, and how the Enlightenment set up autonomy for one's self as with others. Ward creates a Kantian model of liberalism able to examine experience yet make room for freedom.

In the concluding chapters, Ward tackles an ambitious project. He asserts an inclusive variation on John Hick's pluralist model allowing religions to claim part of a whole which may elude human understanding. Flawed as all of human religious attempts are, still, a chance to adapt the personalist Kantian encouragement of an individual and liberal approach grounded in the latest of a move from ancient-local, medieval and early-modern canonical, recent-critical, and contemporary-global phases may free the future of religious adherents to pursue a more expansionist, far less exclusionist ideal.

More than one way must be granted to seek the Eternal Divine, Ward reasons, and his reason itself makes room for what revelation might move people towards fulfilling as a kind of 'theonomy,' to use Paul Tillich's term, in sidling into an imminent realization of what now may be still obscure. Ward packs a lot into the closing vignette, seeing an Indra's Net of multifaceted ways we can view the eternal latent in the external, and calling to at least some of us internally.  He encourages a move to a convergent spirituality where everyone on this planet can find a manner in which to find their own relationship within the spaces open between the Transcendent and the physical, empirical world.

P.S. I reviewed a decade ago Ward's "God: A Guide for the Perplexed"; it appeared at Amazon US where my take on Ward's 2007 "Case" was incarnated 3-5-12. P.P.S. I append his insight into Buddhism after he cites a typical Zen master's "Yes" and "No" responses to a seeker. Ward sensibly concludes: "Perhaps 'Yo' would do, and it would be the answer to all Buddhist questions." (133)

Monday, May 9, 2011

Nicholas Wade's "The Faith Instinct": Book Review

Wade seeks "to try to understand religious behavior from an evolutionary perspective." That our minds carry an instinct "to believe in gods neither proves nor disproves their existence." (5) We're descended from those who, 50,000 years ago, began to develop, in slow order: dance, music, proto-religion based on ritual, language, and then "religion based on shared beliefs about the supernatural." (92) Against external threats, religion binds together a tribe or clan or nation to protect itself; against internal freeloaders, religion provides a deterrence against those who dare to violate the dictates of "a stern overseer of their actions": divine enforcers who can read the thoughts of the guilty and punish those who resist subordinating their gain so as to help the common good. (52)

Pleasures of prayer or goodness may fill the believer, but these, Wade reasons, are secondary to the evolutionary rationale for religion. It's not to provide personal satisfaction so much as to bind people together, to make them "put the group's interests ahead of their own." (58) Those who disobey are punished, now and in the retributory afterlife; those who obey tap into a reward system that, unlike fundamental and primal drives for eating and reproduction, are relatively recent in evolution. Therefore, rewards for faith are "pitched at a far higher cognitive level," and religious behavior gets perceived as sensually satisfying, enhanced by communal celebrations passed down over thousands of years full of music, dance, and ritual.

Wade shows how after the prehistoric traces, often surmised due to lack of material evidence from studies of traditional cultures surviving today (he fills the book with case studies), a tension between ancient ecstatic expressions of spontaneous or dramatic faith and civilized ecclesiastical insitutions of doctrine and order persisted, and why it still does today. We're wired for the revivalist tent more than the upright pew, it seems.

The middle of his narrative steers us past familiar landmarks: the three monotheisms. But, in each, Wade finds fresh insights. Judaism is shown to be a Canaanite tribe's late invention, in the Bible texts "found" when the Temple was renovated. The concepts now packaged as Judaism were backdated to the Pentateuch and other sacred texts from around the 7th c BCE, to justify the attempts of Judah to reclaim the destroyed kingdom of Israel and to build a nation based on one god and not the many who once were shared by the Hebrews and their neighbors in what's now Palestine and the Middle East. The Exodus may have happened if it did to a few stragglers; archeological and historical evidence asserts that Hebrews barely invaded any of their Promised Land, practiced polytheism for centuries, and lagged long before asserting their Torah as law.

Wade illustrates how rare a totally new religion is if it wants to survive. Even the Mormons follow the three monotheisms somewhat, grafted onto their own innovations. Converts generally seek out a religion to enter that provides advantages, and familiarity, so it's usually related to their marital or social networks. Those who accept converts may raise the bar high-- as with circumcision, kosher, and prohibitions on exogamy-- to keep out spies and freeloaders.

Christians benefited from their affinities with Jews until the Jesus-followers, among those still practicing Judaism who did not accept a divine Christ-- were decimated in the destruction of Jerusalem and their community in 70 CE. Then, the Christ-followers triumphed, and Paul's letters, written if genuine between 49-55, carried Greek notions into the new faith, which accepted Gentiles. The Gospels then followed into print, all after the Temple had been destroyed, and then Jesus' predictions were retroactively written into the tales told of Jewish perfidy and punishment meted out to their former nation. The break with Jewish tradition enabled then Christianity to appeal as a transformed mystery cult of sacrifice, resurrection and messianic promise to Hellenized cultures and across Roman lands to all nations.

In turn, in what for me was a new revelation, Wade spends a lot of time discussing recent theories about the origins of Islam not in Arabia, but in the Syriac-Christian regions around Palestine. He suggests according to one scholar who understandably writes under a pseudonym of "Christoph Luxenberg" that the very word "muhammed" is not a proper name but is "servant of God, his messenger" (184) referring (and only named four times in the Qu'ran compared to 24 for Jesus, 79 for Abraham, and 136 of Moses) to Christ and not a prophet from the then backwater of the Hijaz.

Wade cites Michael Cook and Patricia Crone's studies that support an accretionary process of the earliest Islamic writings, one rejected by the Muslims themselves, but advanced by Western revisionist scholars. Islam we know it may not have appeared until a dynastic change long after 632, perhaps under the Abbasid caliph who ruled 813-833. Similar to what the higher criticism of the Bible did for Jews and Christians, fundamentalists reject it, but as with mainstream believers, perhaps in time, Muslims may accept another version of how their attenuated, orally transmitted long before written around 800, foundations are set more in myth as "salvation history," less in fact as if a documentary chronicle.

Later chapters survey anthropological research among primitive peoples and religious denominations. Morality, trust, trade, ecology, warfare, and nationalism all find analysis, if often via case studies rather than extended treatments as theories. Wade keeps these sections short, and sometimes he lurches from sub-topic to sub-topic with little preparation but for a general reader, he presents lots of information accessibly.

In passing, he may make points meriting elaboration he does not offer. Yet, reminders that religion can serve, as in the Middle East now, as the only "robust" force able to challenge autocracy when secular institutions are weak remain more relevant than ever. In an aside, he observes how-- unlike bilingualism and multiethnic identity-- a religious allegiance resists fission, and how emotionally binding it can be for those who grow up with it, or who take it on. It responds to deep-seated behaviors that all of us share, even if we deny them.

Those who now deny this religious impulse keep growing worldwide. As with music, some may refuse to tap into an instinctive appeal that others promote. Modern people appear to be losing their "innate propensity for religious behavior." (284) They grow up unfulfilled, for better or worse, with the lack of this capability for what their ancestors passed down to all of us; those refusing or unable to accept the faith instinct died off or were killed off. Those who accepted faith passed on their genes to all of us, thousands of years ago. But an atavistic leaning towards faith may no longer flourish in a secular, scientific mindset. We may grow out of it.

Therefore, the spirit of a once lively religion languishes when its structures and worldviews are unable to keep up with social complexity and intellectual advances in organized knowledge. Wade cites the Pew 2008 Survey that tallies American Catholics as 24% of the population, while 31% were born into that faith; this is the sharpest decline of any group, and this may show the inability of a faith to keep up with cultural shifts, as perhaps "ill-considered reforms" of Vatican II weakened the cultural distinctiveness of Catholicism while also refusing to adjust to contemporary attitudes about sexuality and clerical inclusion. (258)

Still, billions say they believe. No society ever managed to suppress religion, and Wade finds it a universal trait that we all inherit, whether or not we choose to indulge in its mysterious promptings within our very being. "In the progression from tribe to nation to civilization, religion has remained the most fundamental and binding of all social binding mechanisms. Rationality and security may moderate the expression of religious behavior. Warfare and uncertainty may fill the pews. Religion sustains the essential means whereby people associate in solidarity with one another and in defense against their adversaries."(274-5)

God is still called upon to guide the destiny of one very modern nation. American Civil Religion, the invocation of a semi-Protestant, somewhat secularized Deity and Power to guide citizens and informed leaders, Wade shows, serves as a case study in a modern religion that to those who observe it, even as it appears almost invisible in our culture. The tension between "legal secularists" enforcing a separate status for believers and those advocating a fundamentalist resurgence continues, even as the marketplace theory of religion (take it or leave it, switch brands, mix and match) competes more and more globally. (See my review of Olivier Roy's recent study on how culture and religion part ways, "Holy Ignorance.")

A "propensity for religious behavior" appears "genetically embedded in the human neural circuitry." (270) Oddly, Wade answers Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris but not the evolutionary biologist Daniel Dennett, whose "Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon" (all three authors reviewed by me) is a glaring absence from this narrative. Dennett shares with Wade a detached, careful examination of why so many varieties of religious experience persist, whether atheists, skeptics, and believers like it or not. The problem, Wade concludes, is that religions have not kept up with culture; by refusing to yield on values or principles, the "three monotheisms" risk losing their tenacious hold on modern folks. They may not last forever, as today's religious adherents and leaders who could negotiate adjustment to culture often refuse to evolve.

I found this a stimulating book. I wish a bibliography and not only an end-note list had been given, for ease of reference. Also, the index does not cover every fact entered or source cited. Stiil, this is a diverse collection of ideas from scientists and scholars who have advanced what we know about why we are drawn to belief.

(Posted to Amazon US 4-4-11. See also my review of Michel Onfray's barbed counterpart, speared with venom if wit as "Atheist Manifesto: the Case Against Christianity, Judaism, and Islam" in PopMatters Re:Print featured 4-28-11 and a review in a simpler, shorter version the same day at Lunch.com or Amazon US.)

Friday, July 16, 2010

Sam Harris' "Letter to a Christian Nation": Book Review

This condenses neo-atheist arguments efficiently if briskly. It sums up secular humanism. It prefaces longer works by Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, and Daniel Dennett. It’s a pithy, barbed attack.

I’ve reviewed on Amazon, alongside with hundreds or thousands of bickering peers, “The God Delusion,” “god Is Not Great,” and “Breaking the Spell”-- as well as “The End of Faith.” (See my Amazon US review in Oct. 2004). Compared to “End,” I preferred Harris’ 2006 riposte. It ups the ante. Yet, it seems a lost cause no matter if you agree or disagree, given the polemical stances most critics assume. However, I tried to read this as fairly and objectively as possible. For comparison, I’ve also reviewed works such as Dean Hamer's “The God Gene” and Francis Collins' “The Language of God."

Given less than a hundred small pages in large print, this response to Harris’ outraged Christian readers cannot equal the scientific depth of Dennett, the cultural critique of Hitchens, and the magisterial tone of Dawkins. Instead, a rapid paraphrase of opposing views to his compressed assertions suffices. This review cannot address the immense philosophical arguments or the geo-political ramifications of the neo-atheist agenda. Instead, I will cite his main points. Judge if this book merits your attention.

He repeats Dawkins’ complaint that liberal believers “lend tacit support to the religious divisions in our world.” (ix) He thinks progressive adherents lend comfort as it were to the “divisive, injurious, retrograde” versions of Christianity, for instance. However, he grants that liberals and moderates “can recognize a common cause” with unbelievers as they confront extremists and fundamentalists. (x)

Belittling literalists: “If we take Jesus in half his moods, we can easily justify the actions of St. Francis of Assisi” –- His other half justifies the Inquisition. (14) Yet, Harris acknowledges that such sacrificial self-denial for the greater good may be admirable. It’s only that one need not be a believer in the virgin birth or that Jesus “will be returning to earth as a superhero to take those teachings to heart.” (25) For those who condemn enemies of organized religion as atheist monsters—-Hitlers, Stalins, Pol Pots—-Harris coolly stresses how their problem is not that they “reject the dogma of religion,” but that these tyrants “embrace other life-destroying myths.” (41) Not extreme rationalism but unfettered “political and racial dogmatism” can be blamed for this totalitarianism. As with religious intolerance, it’s rooted in dogma.

Intriguingly, he finds red states in their religious and social conservatism in worse shape as to crime; 50 nations lowest in the UN’s “human development index” he concludes “are unwaveringly religious.” (44) Harris claims that atheist societies in advanced economies devote far more to charitable aid and social welfare programs. They also have far lower rates of CEO vs. worker income disparity: compare 13:1 in Sweden to 475:1 in the U.S. Teen pregnancy rates in the U.S are four-five times that of other advanced nations even as the U.S. proclaims far higher levels of devotion to Jesus.

“Atheism is nothing more than the noises reasonable people make in the presence of unjustified religious beliefs.” (51) No more than Zeus or Poseidon, Harris regards God or Allah. “An atheist is a person who believes that the murder of a single little girl—-even once in a million years—-casts doubt upon the idea of a benevolent God.” (52) Due to doubt, nonbelievers who question taboos, hatreds, wars, even “diversion of scarce resources”—all the suffering attributed to religious fanaticism-- get relegated to the margins: compared to “the fantasy life” of one’s “neighbors.” (57) “Religion is the one area of our lives where people imagine that some other standard of intellectual integrity applies.” (65)

He neatly inverts the arguments used by Christians against atheists to ask why Christians are not convinced by Islam. “Understand that the way you view Islam is precisely the way devout Muslims view Christianity. And it is the way I view all religions.” (7) Conflating the claims of damnation sallied by Muslims with those of Christians, he warns how elusive will be the hopes of interfaith dialogue among pacified People of the Book. Millions will ally to die fighting against Christians before “they would allow your version of compassion to gain a foothold on the Arabian Peninsula.” (86) We don’t worship the same God in the same way, he chides; ask the Shi’a about the Sunni.

Raising children as Jews, Muslims, or Christians, he complains, is a “ludicrous obscenity.” He repeats, if more strongly worded, this protest from “End of Faith.” I am not sure how Harris can persuade his opponents, but he articulates the defiant unbeliever who denies the confidence of the faithful. This charged language may inflame his foes further, but he matches their fire with his own. Whether this is the most successful approach to take may not matter. I find corroboration in his dismissal of interfaith dialogue and platitudes about reconciling “worldviews that are fundamentally incompatible and, in principle, immune to revision” (87). As with slavery, biblically sanctioned, he muses it may be a long struggle to convince irrational believers that scripture cannot trump morality to extend human rights.

Scientifically, Harris strives to dismantle, if hurriedly given the space allotted, the intelligent design proponents as well as creationists (the latter a Gallup poll tallies at 53% of the U.S. population). Of our plumbing that mixes our windpipe with our esophagus: “perhaps God has prepared a special reward in heaven for every child who chokes to death on a bottle cap.” (79) For those less trusting in inscrutable ways of a Creator, Harris can only sigh: “How is it ‘moral’ to think like this?”

Harris concludes: “This letter is the product of failure” for the attacks on religion that preceded it to bring about the death of God. (91) He wonders why the schools have not taught this message, why the media fails to criticize “the abject religious certainties of our public figures,” and the despair over the social failures “great and small that have kept almost every society on this earth muddling over God and despising those who muddle differently.” He cannot accept why Muslims chant “death to whole nations of the living” and how Christians deny “tangible reality, by the suffering you create in service to your religious myths, and by your attachment to an imaginary God.”

I’m unconvinced Harris’ vehemence will sway any Christian soldiers. His frustration shows. This may be more a handbook for those happy being preached to by the choir, but for that, Harris’s return to the polemical arena may be a welcome harbinger of the long-delayed victory neo-atheists seek in their resurgence to win. He refuses to back down, and he seems to relish this combative stance. He tires of conciliation, and wearies of compromise—and here he matches those he resists, as in any epic battle. (Once more into the fray, posted to Amazon US after 600-odd predecessors, 7-16-10)

Thursday, June 24, 2010

Julian Baggini's "Atheism: A Very Short Introduction": Book Review

Calmly, non-dogmatically, this explains how not anti-religious so much as pro-naturalist stances can define a more positive version of atheism that accentuates reason to counter belief, myth, and superstition. As a philosopher, Baggini in a hundred pages manages to survey the moral foundations for rational assertions, the weakness of unverifiable claims of faith, and the hopes that this orientation will help men and women to grow up, if painfully, while leaving behind childish illusions.

He starts by countering assumptions that "atheism can only exist as a parasitic rival to theism," or that atheism needs to be nihilistic. If God could be proven to have never existed, he points out, we'd still have had atheists, if not by that name! It encompasses positive views of human potential and commonsensical self-actualization, not merely the naysaying sneers of caricatured malcontents.

He then makes the case for atheism based on experience, observation, and truth claims. Faith by its very definition relies on that not seen. Atheism cannot accept this as evidence of a divine presence. It does not ask us to go against our own reason or what can be measured or grasped. He demolishes Pascal's wager, ontological and cosmological proofs for God, and the appeal to one religion among so many choices as the only true one. If atheists cannot be a 100% sure, this only shows them the necessity to avoid militancy, oppression, or intolerance as they convince by nonjudgmental, non-dogmatic methods.

These tie into ethics, and Baggini steps into Aristotleian, Kantian, existentialist, and utilitarian concepts for much of the middle of his text. This seems perhaps a detour, but Baggini as a philosopher seeks to establish a foundation for morality that does not need a scripture, revelation, or belief as its construction. He then takes up the position that atheism can offer us meaning and purpose. "If we pretend or imagine that life's purpose lies outside living itself, we will be searching the stars for what is underneath our feet all the time." (67)

He looks at the history of atheism. He reminds us that moral people need not believe in the supernatural. Terry Pratchett is cited well: "I think I'm probably an atheist, but rather angry with God for not existing." (70)

Then, he defends a committed, caring atheism against charges that the Communists were such. This does not disprove atheism's truth anymore, he avers, than Hitler disproves the value of vegetarianism. Too severe a distorted application of ideology in whatever cause, Baggini warns, will lead to inhumanity pursued for principles that forget tradition, advance zealotry, and deny human nature's need for liberty and respect.

Finally, he links atheism to the progression of human culture away from innocence as well as ignorance. He examines how evil persists and how theodicy fails to account for this problem. Superstitions are replaced by rational explanations for the forces around us and within us. We learn to live as mature beings within finitude.

I found a few concepts, perhaps due to such compression for this fine Oxford series, that I would have liked to hear more about. Agnosticism's "suspension of belief" Baggini rejects as not accepting the "strong claims" that God does not exist as opposed to the "weak claims" that He may, but this needed more elaboration. He skims over how a bliss-filled afterlife in a non-human-like state might not represent fulfillment, and considering Stephen Batchelor's "Confession of a Buddhist Atheist" and "Buddhism Without Beliefs" (see my reviews), I'd be curious about non-theistic approaches that might jibe better than Baggini might think with his own rationalism.

He precedes the bestsellers of Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, and Christopher Hitchens (see my reviews) by a few years. He takes up Dawkins's evolutionary studies briefly, however. He appeals to a less confrontational stance on non-fundamentalist religion and acknowledges the good that religions do can be separated from their harm, contrary to the more combative approaches taken by many subsequent contenders in the past decade's neo-atheist resurgence.(Compare Robin Le Poidevin's "Agnosticism" in this same series, also reviewed by me.)

This is an optimistic, thoughtful work I enjoyed. Baggini succeeds in writing a book that atheists can share with those who wonder about this often misunderstood and feared system of thought. Not belief, but a philosophical, positive humanism that puts people ahead of spirits, and our capacity for living up to our best selves as our goal, freed from fear of torment or punishment from unseen forces. Whatever your own position, this primer challenges you to examine your own suppositions carefully. (Posted to Amazon US 6-24-10)

Tuesday, March 2, 2010

How humanists might trust the spirit

Robert Wright writes about the folly of assuming critics such as Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett deploy reason to their advantage when dismissing religious persistence. Wright reminds us that the "virus" attributed to belief by the two scientists fails to distinguish the symbiotic relationship possible between evolutionary advantages for believers and the parasitic association implicit in how Dawkins and Dennett use the loaded term "virus" in their purportedly objective presentations of data. Wright also notes that the "zero-sum" attitude within such reductive diminishments of religious contributions does little for the rationalist opposition to bolster their ethical bonafides. Wright's brief entry comes on Andrew Sullivan's "The Daily Dish" blog, carried by the Atlantic Monthly, "Are the New Atheists Really Rational?".

This reminded me of what I'd read two hours before, in Christopher S. Queen's chapter about Buddhism and psychology in the scholarly collection (my review will follow on this blog; it's up on Amazon US already) "Westward Dharma: Buddhism beyond Asia." Queen follows an author I've discussed on this blog, Stephen Batchelor, in advocating a "methodological agnosticism." This careful objectivity refuses to freeze our conceptions of any Grand Unified Theory That Explains It All Once and For All, so to speak awkwardly. A Buddhist might phrase it more pithily: "let go."

We cannot do it all. Put your own house in order first. Take the time to do what you do well lest you undo what others have not done well to make it worse. Listen to what the spirit, soul, psyche, whatever non-theistic if you prefer message within prompts, within the quiet you hear, before grabbing the mike or running up to the podium to preach to the rest of us your particular salvation show. Or as Dylan sang: "don't follow leaders." Not sure how "watch your parking meters" fits, but good advice I'm sure you'll agree.

My kids were watching the opening credits of the failed adaptation of "Watchmen." Again, increasing no doubt the budget with the original singer braying "The Times They Are A-Changing" again, the crawl recreated under the titles many iconic moments from the '60s, among them a clip of an immolated monk in Saigon. My older son scoffed at the seemingly endless parade of scenes such as this; the movie already seemed long. My younger son told me that in "South Park," said monk's accidentally lit on fire by Chef (not sure if Isaac Hayes or Barry White) who tries to ignite a racist flag of the town in protest, and up instead flames a monk sitting behind him. The original context, alas, seemed lost on my boys, despite my explanation. I found out his name, Thich Quang Duc, and the day, June 1, 1963. Buddhists later led a peaceful if quixotic overthrow of Diem in '66, who wanted to turn Vietnam into a Catholic nation. Brave monks seem driven and perhaps in this life doomed to protest, now in Burma and Tibet-- if to dimmed revulsion on network t.v. as opposed to rebellion by way of cellphones, Twitters, and contraband cameras.

The regimes now learn to censor better what they sell to the networks, perhaps, in collusion. Given we're all "indebted" to the PRC for national and personal finances, I consider how the rapt Western media fawned over Beijing's Olympics vs. ten years ago making the Dalai Lama an Apple celebrity pitchman, co-opted for "being different." We'd hate to offend the 1.3 billion who enable bargains at Wal-Mart and the 99-Cent Store. Is the Tibetan or Burmese resistance as outnumbered as the "White Rose" was against the Nazis? These despots do not proclaim any religious utopia, but the boot on the face, forever, predicted by Orwell, and witnessed by him already in Fascist-- and Stalinist-- Spain. I wonder how future generations will judge our capitulation to similar oppression, as we bow to global finance to pay what we owe?

The example of resister and eloquent advocate of non-violence from the '60s, Thich Nhat Hanh, may not be as famous as the Dalai Lama. But, in French exile, he promotes his concept and his community centered around "interbeing." This pulls the individual back into line with the community, but in this "interdependent" tug there's controlled movement forward, not relentless dragging by a bully or reluctant kicking from a cowed recruit beside you. One selects where and how to do one's best, not out of some hypnotized chanting of slogan or mantra, but out of a prepared, grounded, and thoughtful intervention done with literally pre-meditation. Unless one takes the trouble to set one's self straight, one will find one's self in trouble on a dangerous detour away from the best path upon which one will meet one's match, to help, to heal, to listen, to learn from as well as to teach. Sound like babble from a typical Californian, or a distillation at the keyboard of timeless wisdom?

My point after today's reading from three disparate but overlapping sources? Not to wind up naval-gazing, not to vanish within your own vision, but to move this necessary detachment away from "ideological zealotry," or "zero-sum" (Queen too uses this adjective) political or policy treatment that ignores the spiritual as it seeks to solve the actual problems. Many ask what good is meditation, and like the Buddha, Queen counters that only out of one's own restoration of balance and purpose can one then take on the array of difficulties surely overwhelming us. We need to choose our battles, as the cliché to harried parents goes, and fight the good fight, as another cliché went.

This "engaged Buddhism" applies to the blog post I shared last summer about the Black Mountain Zen Centre in Belfast and the efforts of such as Bernard Glassman, founder of the Zen Peacemaker Order, an activist alliance founded in the mid-90s in Washington D.C. to put dharma into practice for the ease of suffering in real-world, tangible programs. Increasingly, whatever one's views on monasticism, retreats, and inner-directed self-help, I think that those out there (my late dad despite his Catholic piety was a big practical naysayer to monks "doing nothing but praying all day") worn out by strife along sectarian, party, or philosophical lines after so many decades of turf wars, peace walls, and reconciliation workshops may want to settle down and recognize the good that can come from learning to sit still a while.

Too often, we rush out to the barricades to change it all. My wife's been volunteering with a well-intentioned local branch of a national non-profit founded with great intentions by hipster do-gooders who had made money off their memoirs about the hipsters like themselves and who then wanted to start tutoring poor kids in the big cities. The problem is that the paid staff cannot be bothered with assisting the volunteers. It's a half-run, half-baked set of grand initiatives that may sound ideal when getting the grants, but fail dismally when delivering the goods.

She's so frustrated that the center may well lose her expertise soon. The burn-out by compassion fatigue and the Great Society and so many subsequent trillions of our taxpayer dollars thrown at similar inner-city schemes remind me that many who jump in to put out the fire fail to learn how to don protective gear. They get burned, those they want to save get consumed, and the truck and the firefighters drive off to another conflagration all over again down the block, another arson on another night.

Jay Michaelson-- the prototypical hipster able to go off to the Himalayas for a five-month silent retreat, and then return to Yale Law to teach or write poetry or get grants himself or practice his gay-yoga-dharma-Torah while apparently leading a wonderfully intellectual East Coast Jewish life that seems Platonic in its forms-- writes again in his column "The Polymath" in the "Forward" about the need to recharge ourselves before charging out for "tikkun olam." In "Allowing the 'Yetzer Tov' To Win," he starts by admitting his own reluctance to meditate or exercise, vs. grabbing another beer or updating his Facebook page.

He urges us to do something, call it spirituality even if "we're not the spiritual type." (I digress in an already lengthy piece, but my wife watching Bill Maher last night really ticked me off when he idiotically lambasted the "religion" of Buddhism re: Tiger Woods' confession. This professional debunker-- whose hapless slaying of sacred cows with rhetorical overkill ruined his documentary "Religulous," as clumsy as its title-- roused laughs from the Tibetan practice of selecting a "tulku" from the newborn reincarnation of a lama. Yes, ripe for satire if "South Park," but on Maher's show, his rant smelled sour, felt frantic, and rang dim. Maher's smug self-righteous act tempted my articulation of a "yetzer hara," the evil word in me, but I stayed silent, continued my work for school on my laptop, and tuned him out.)

Many confuse doctrine with dogma, and popular Buddhist practice shows this despite the corrections of non-theistic gurus. Good luck charms, statues, candles, flowers, amulets, pictures of saints or loved ones-- it's natural for humans to comfort ourselves. The caveat and implicit distinction that Buddhism is not originally a "religion" I add for pedantry; many apply its ethical and existential principles as with Batchelor in "Buddhism Without Beliefs" (reviewed by me recently) alongside or apart from any devotion, obesiance, or profession of piety per se.

I cite the heart of Michaelson's essay. Nice to see the Velvet Underground applied to the care of the soul and the ethics of the fathers (and mothers), the Pirke Avot of Jewish tradition, to repair the shattered vessels, the torn and weary human realm.
Don’t we believe, religionists and secularists both, that there are faculties of the self worth developing, and that if we do not develop them, we are somehow missing out on something essential about the human condition?

And do we humanists not believe that the gifts of this world, whether endowed by a Creator or not, are here to be savored? That our hours on Earth are to be led deliberately, sucking the marrow out of life? And if we do believe such things, then what a shame it is to restrict the horizons of our experience to the zones of the familiar or the conventional. There are ecstasies, insights and loves that are our birthright as human beings; there are experiences so profound and so holy that it seems the greatest of shames to pass them by out of ignorance or fear. As Lou Reed once sang, “some kinds of love/the possibilities are endless/and for me to miss one/would seem to be groundless.”

My claim is that while we each may prefer different spiritual flavors, all of us require spiritual nourishment if we are to be anything other than the humanistic equivalents of 98-pound weaklings. Without some way of opening the heart, expanding the mind and integrating the body, we’re incomplete human beings — and our incompleteness has real effects on ourselves and those around us. Time and time again, our tradition warns us against hardening our hearts. There’s a reason for that: The hardened heart doesn’t know what it’s missing, doesn’t care and doesn’t want to do anything about it.
I am thinking of a determined friend of mine who may read this blog entry. He's spent long years, many suffering in self-inflicted sacrifice and under torture for a cause for which he first gave up his youth and then his contact with his family. The intensity of his convictions led him to take another man's life. By this he was convinced that he would radically better his vexed corner of this unjust world. This led him as a convicted teenager into prison. Long stints later, he left as an adult with a doctorate as he labored to master the workings of the movement's political philosophies that he embodied.

He eloquently and vociferously differs from my own religious sympathy with the contributions of Catholicism-- despite its many scandals-- to our culture; he and I agree on the many detriments also accompanying perhaps any human-directed attempt to produce indoctrination. As a former Marxist, he too may recognize the appeal of a secular technology mimicking the movements of that claimed to be the divine will evinced in the hands of a few chosen leaders appointed to carry out the demands of an historically shattering, messianic or utopian scheme that orders billions of people to follow the liberating Will-to-Power, Little Red Book, Manifesto, Scripture from on high. Ultimately, as Batchelor cites, the dharma itself is not to be followed-- unless the listener tests it out personally. After being convinced of its truth, one may put it into practice. I am reminded of the Torah at Sinai. The Hebrews were told to "do" it first; afterwards they'd "get it" by a higher understanding. The action precedes the insight. Carrying out the orders makes you understand them. This reminds me of "culture precedes consciousness" in what used to be a Marxian koan.

Many of his colleagues, and his enemies, hardened their hearts. They keep rancor and fondle bitterness. Many of them spent time in prison alongside him. Upon his release and his renunciation of the policies that led to betrayal by the leadership of his movement, comrades turned his sudden enemies. He decided to tell the truth about what he saw around him, the gaps between party policies and media proclamations clashing with the injustices and corruption now perpetrated by his colleagues and his bosses, rather than only by those long defined as the conventional foe across the divide drawn by neighborhood, border, creed, surname, sect, and flag. The cynical actions of those who he once followed led to his deeper understanding of their hypocrisy and collusion. Out of this, he asserted his own moral principles against threats to his life and that of his family. He did what he had to do, and he learned why his allegiance then aligned with forces that renounced violence and hate.

So, maybe even non-believers can let the "yetzer tov" win, the "good side" within us all. He figures that without religion, goodness would flourish easier. I wonder, for the neo-atheists seem to me as shrill as those whom they seek to convince of their futile faith.

A relevant aside: "'Atheist Ireland' publishes 25 Blasphemous Quotes" to protest a new PC-Catholic backed-- by Fine Gael with the Greens-- law in the Irish Republic against such, as of 1 Jan. 2010. (I wrote most of this entry last summer and let it mellow. However, the hundreds of comments at that URL show the folly of typing before thinking.) The vast majority of over 500 comments in one day-- when I checked around New Year's Day-- displayed spiteful, puerile, invective-laden anti-religious comments appended. The shouters betray far more intolerance than that they protest against with this law.

For both the left and right, believers and deniers, humanists and God-fearers, the trick is in the self-control we exercise, the self-actualization we achieve. Not chanting slogans or scripture at our put-upon neighbor. As Buddhism, Judaism, and any shrink might agree, we all have a moment when we pause before we act. We make the choice, as Michaelson explains, whether or not to listen to the whisper within.
"So next time your heart tells you, on a small scale or a large one, that it would rather have another beer, click another link, or otherwise postpone and delude and equivocate, tell your inner selfish child to get lost. It’s not “you” — it is a set of mental patterns, many of which probably have long outlived their usefulness. Don’t believe it! The part that appears to be doing all the controlling is itself not under your control. And it has no idea what it is missing, because that is precisely what needs to be transformed."
I started with Wright urging the neo-atheists to reconsider their reduction of religious opponents to their minimal presence rather than their possible potential as compatriots in a struggle to put an "engaged" witness to work to better everyone's suffering. I moved towards Queen's glimpse into how Buddhists join with others of faith or no faith or non-faith to fight for peaceful justice. And, after a snack spent reflecting on Michaelson's reminder for humanists to find their reflection perhaps in those confessing a very different set of values, I pass along these thoughts to you. Familiar as they are, perhaps even more so than Lou Reed's lyrics, they may resonate at a quiet moment within you as you listen to their chords.

Cartoon: Dave Piraro, "Bizarro". C/o "Open Parachute" blog: "We're atheists".

Tuesday, December 22, 2009

Stonehenge Stuff & Solstice Thoughts

"What's with all the Stonehenge stuff these days?" So inquires a fellow Irish American who shares such predilections, but who wonders why so many book reviews in a row. I answered her on Facebook:
"it's a continuation of the Celtic Buddhist concepts and inventions that I've been researching the past year, and which I spoke about at Maynooth two months ago. I learned there listening to real neopagans who were also scholars that I needed to find out more about the contexts in Ireland and Celtic cultures which they worked in, to understand the eclecticism into which Buddhist converts were mixing and matching. Thus, my witchy pagan reading lately, which I've strung up as blog posts timed for the solstice, wouldn't you know?"


I'm sitting typing this in the sun, not even 2 p.m., as it already lengthens across me and the (mostly) black cat, Gary, who since my work laptop was partially resurrected, likes to keep me company and watch the screen. Yesterday we were also here as the rays basked us, and I thought about my research interests, and how they intersected with my personal ones. My wife noted last night-- as she prints out my blog entries if not book reviews (too arcane) to send off to a prisoner whom we hope to visit Christmas morning-- how my posts had not been non-academic for this current mailing. So, at least two readers have remarked, if obliquely, on this bent. I figured I'd ruminate.

An interlibrary loan, Michael Strimska's edited "Modern Paganism in World Cultures," finally came in nearly two months after I'd requested it. As I wrote about in a related Irish entry after the Maynooth one, at Loughcrew cairns, I'd been talking to Carole Cusack, a medievalist like me, who after her work on the Christianization of the Saxons in Germany became so disheartened that she gravitated into the study of paganism. This anthology she recommended to me, as I'd already done background reading into neopaganism. She'd published her book on the decline of the traditional ways under the assaults of missionaries, kings, and Teutonic Knights; it's listed by Strimska in the preface, so far what I've finished of his collection.

Insiders within these movements-- who are mostly professional and all academically trained scholars-- present case studies from America, the British Isles, and Europe. Here, Italians, Irish, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, a few in our U.S. military, English "Heathenry," and Icelandic & North American Asatru have all returned to, reinvented, and revived their ethnic and "natural"-- in both senses of the term-- traditional practices. This process for me from Celtic Reconstructionism I knew, but I was less aware of a renaissance other European nationalities, glossy profiles about pixieish Björk among her island's fellow elf-followers aside.

I'll be intrigued to find out more; Cusack praised its fine essay on Druidry, but only later did I discover it's written by another scholar with whom we'd shared information at that very conference that weekend, Jenny Butler of University College, Cork. She had given as a participant-researcher her perspective on Irish neopaganism, her dissertation topic. As I have commented before, the pairing of those who believe with those who analyze we are very familiar with from every variety of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism, but for lesser-known practices, those able to combine belief with detachment to survey their field may account for their modest profile even in scholarship to date. (Pre-eminent scholar Ronald Hutton tells of such denigration by his own colleagues in "Witches, Druids, and King Arthur"-- as reviewed by me in my previous blog post and on Amazon US.)

As I studied Strimska's introduction, discussing such misconceptions, my wife had the BBC World News on. A segment came on about the rise of British pagans, now up to 100,000 and rapidly increasing. A man with a hooded antler decoration stood among a circle of worshippers at yesterday's winter solstice. The broadcast took pains to be fair. (We noted in the same segment a house in Nazareth's excavation was labelled as when and where "Jesus is said to have lived"-- this careful qualification'd never be uttered in America.) Still, my decidedly liberal and tolerant (compared to me) wife snorted as the earnest, happy pagan family interviewed was shown on their suburban estate in Dorset. My fourteen-year-old son asked me then what were pagans. Are they satanists? I replied, looking up from my book, that they were not, but they were people looking for a nature-based religion that went back to pre-Christian practices and beliefs. Education comes slowly for us.

So far, as with witches and the controversy that I mentioned in chairing a panel discussion on goddess spirituality at NUI Maynooth, even basic terms become contentious. Like "queer," can a despised group reclaim the word that has denigrated them? Is neo-pagan a put-down or an honest admission of the lack of continuity most Western Europeans suffer when seeking to resurrect a heritage warped into "folklore" at best and obliterated most of the time by Western church and state over millennia?

Is it safe to declare one's self a pagan when this represents opposition to the ruling powers in global cultures, even in secular, scientific, or capitalist guises? Pagans, as Strimska carefully explains in his study, debate similar questions. I think of neopagans as a depth charge, feared by many who condemn or caricature the Other, diffused from our ghost tales and vampiric fantasies, full of forests and specters, rituals and spells. Certainly-- as my family even displayed reacting to their coverage on the most even-handed network an American at least might imagine, the BBC-- pagans remain misunderstood. I wonder how many of them I have met without knowing it, with so much ostracization, prejudice, and mockery aligned against them?

After a quarter-century teaching, I conjure up only one student that spoke up, a confident woman who was ten years ago about my age. Among an enormous class (over 50) for "Technology, Culture & Society," the course I give regularly, a liberal-arts token in the pile of technical and business chips credited for the gambler that this degree program will result in lucre and ease for those enrolled where I labor, a wild card indeed. She wore a small silver pentacle, a metal disk, around her neck, so I asked her later about it after I had noticed it while handing out the syllabus. She replied simply that she was a pagan. Her confidence and ease impressed me-- I wonder if she as so many poised and motivated students whom I teach was a veteran-- and I learned a bit more from her about pentangle and pentagram vs. pentacle, for good measure. My encounter with these insignia limited to heavy-metal logos and "Sir Gawain & the Grene Knyght," a rare chance for me to talk about a topic even remotely connected to my ever-receding, Ph.D. trained, once intense and now by professional duty fading, medievalist past.

That quiz I took a few months ago fixing me at a neat hundred percent both for Mahayana Buddhism (a tendency I read by a "Buddheo-pagan" that in his opinion urges "antidotes" for difficulties while Theravada "avoids" them, an interesting distinction; he said Tantric-Bo strains via Tibet then embraced and engaged these energies rather than eluding them, by magic and propitiation and control) and "Neo-Pagan" did cause me to reflect. Given my research and thinking the past nearly two years the first caused me less of a double-take than the second match-up. After all, I don't count myself as a tree-hugger. I am pale, resist the sun, and am a stay-at-homebody. While I admire the outdoors I prefer to encounter it in the shade, from inside, in a comfy chair and cup of tea-- much like my setting this moment.

But then I tuned in to my wavelength. I recalled from a teenaged study in my religion class where I found myself rooting more for the witch of Endor than the prophet Samuel; the temple women who served Astarte by spirit as sex rather than the grim priests who slaughtered those worshippers; the Druids who seemed to me far too compliant to give it over to humorless Patrick; the Lithuanians who I learned stood against the Christians until nearly 1400 as the last heathens in Western Europe: I found myself often even as a bookish lad on the side of these underdogs.

I return often in my mind to the lemon groves where I once played that now lie under the Foothill 210 Freeway, and now with my eye to the hills around me carved by gaunt stucco monstrosities. "Developer" to me? An occupation meriting relegation to the lowest circle of hell. New technology allows builders to prop up concrete where they could not before, the relentless push for big-box this and sprawl-fueled that which epitomizes my native overpopulated city. Open space translates as undeveloped land; construction must always push up our quarterly GDP. Progress-- while nods I give to laptops and dentistry and potable water and my doughty Volvo-- can sap my spirits.

Contemplating the continued shabbiness of the Northern legacy unravelling from the Fenian "physical-force tradition" that I've long studied in Irish republicanism; our foreign policy as revenge tangled via one-god dogma through a commander-in-chief however democratically elected; our politics; the systematic reduction of myself as a teacher and my students as learners into corporatized standardization learning platforms and pre-fab formats; the chain store mentality that erodes the little guys and gals; the media demands to spend more this holiday season despite blizzards and foreclosures. Ringing changes on my usual litany of how weary this society makes me.

Perhaps the interest I have in informed dissent, in principled individualism, in the soul's "alternatives" betrays only my romanticism, my hypocrisy as I churn this out on a keyboard and a wireless network's wonder, designed by such as those whom I prepare for that labor force, allow me to pose as if an ethical Luddite. In broadcasting this to you, I am reminded of Margot Adler's survey in her (yes, that review's in line next) "Drawing Down the Moon." Computer workers and data analysts disproportionately comprise a share of those involved in neopaganism. They would agree with what I tell those students in that very course-- the moral Luddite does not as mythic Ned Ludd burn down the factory mills simply out of mindless revolt.

A Luddite weighs the human costs against the machine's demands. That's what I try to do. I cannot give up this keyboard, and I certainly cannot unless Deep Springs College in Death Valley invites me to be one of their ranch-hand profs escape the long reach of the monitor that logs me in and time-stamps my daily required labor as I "deliver" rather more often than truly teach mass-produced course content to my students. Even the post-Thanksgiving shift away from birds in our house and rarely fish on the dish poses a new challenge for my family. But, I attempt as I wrestle with these forces not to "avoid" but as would a good Mahayana to "aspire" to rearrange my troubled soul and soothe my restless intellect. That is, to make out of my ever-shifting religious, spiritual, and mental landscape a place where I can make of not sense than create peace out of my surroundings.

Outside, the sun fell beneath the trees as it neared four o'clock. The brisk wind has stopped and the cat next to my chair looks out on the shadows. I can feel the prematurely twilit change on my hands in the temperature as I finish this. The knoll around our house means that darkness comes even sooner to this small neck of what once were not woods but weeds. But what are weeds unless classified by us? Left alone, a humble wildflower, a nameless bloom, a gnarled thicket. Last night, where the sun set, overhead a crescent moon tilted up as if to hold high above herself a bit of if not all the night sky.

(You know what Stonehenge looks like, and probably those in Druidic panoply. So, a found object, the assertion of the organic over the artificial. We see what we do by framing it, part of our ancient human quality to search for patterns all around us in the natural realm. Out of these we may make up stories and we may see gods. At one time, everyone in our family trees did this. They passed their patterns on: culture. They looked up and made shapes out of stars. We look at them long after the Greeks and Romans turned away from pagan ways. Yet, can we separate their perception of a Big Dipper from our random plot of celestial magnitudes? Have we evolved towards or away from this cognitive tendency today? If so, is this move away from narrative and metaphor towards dissection and measurement an advancement towards the triumph of reason, or a lurch away from ecological balance and awed humility? End of lecture: see Daniel Dennett's "Breaking the Spell" (reviewed by me on Amazon US & this blog a while back) for a rejoinder from the laboratory.

Photo via blogmate, "Bo" of a tree near his Cambridge dwelling, where seasons really do change. Behind the chicken-wire, sylvan mystery opens. This image may be a bit too Georgia O'Keefe after reflection, but I found myself drawn to it. And I never was one for Freud, by the by, so there.)