Neatly inscribed, as if in a handwriting-imitative font in its precision, at the back of a secondhand copy of Richard Seaver’s
I Can't Go On, I'll Go On: A Samuel Beckett Reader, I found this meditation:
In each moment there is a question, made up of smaller
questions, made up of smaller sub-questions, divided by both the senses
and by experience, held together by emotion, logic, reason...Herein lies
the playground of the mind, to seek understanding, weighing each answer
according to its source, and only by the receipt of information are
these moments connected. If by chance the answers aren't enough, or the
questions not right, there is no space between then and now, and
certainly no time to tell the difference. There is only repetition.
Question everything. Experience the best of everything. Forget the
questions and remember how you asked them.
Seaver, Beckett's editor, provided a reminiscence. It concludes:
For in his dimming landscape, peopled with clowns and misfits,
has-beens and ne'er-do-wells, the malformed and the deformed, those on
the threshold of death or already on the other side (‘I don't remember
when I died’), he has created a stark world far different from our own,
hardly recognizable, a nether world, a purgatory, or perhaps
Antepurgatory, having nothing whatsoever to do with us.
Our world. (xlv)
Wherever it originated, that (for me) anonymous statement alongside these editorial comments reminded me of
Buddhism Without Beliefs by
Stephen Batchelor. This former Zen and Tibetan monk clears clutter
around Buddha, karma, rebirth, gurus, and temples. He favors a
therapeutic approach akin to a psychologist in his non-denominational,
non-theistic guidance. He admits we-- as with the Buddha-- do not know
what happened or will happen regarding our place in the universe.
He leaves it at that. He pushes us past sterility, ritual, and
codified belief into a mature, democratic, and communally responsible
morality that renews what has frozen into mantra, temple, and guru. He
proposes agnostic confrontation rather than consolation, derived not
from salvation or reward but existential honesty. How do we go on when
we feel we can't go on? How long, O Lord, how long, as the Psalmist
cried out —long before
Godot?
Batchelor's brief but rich treatise can inform anyone. I think
secular and atheist readers might benefit most. (I note his newest book —
out last month — titled
Confession of a Buddhist Atheist
trumpets a blurb by Christopher Hitchens; this may indicate Batchelor’s
desire to leap on a neo-atheist bandwagon waving a non-theist prayer
flag.) In a section on ‘emptiness’, that fundamental dharma teaching, he
tells us how:
much of the time we fail to register what is happening here and
now. We are reliving an edited version of the past, planning an
uncertain future, or indulging in being elsewhere. Or running on
automatic pilot, without being conscious at all.
And instead of a coherent personality that stretches back into
an unbroken line to a first memory and looks forward to an indefinite
future, we discover a self ridden with gaps and ambiguities. Who ‘I am’
appears coherent only because of the monologue we keep repeating,
editing, censoring, and embellishing in our heads. (24)
He explains that we are less the hero of a B-movie starring
ourselves but as ‘more akin to the complex and ambiguous characters who
emerge, develop, and suffer across the pages of a novel. There is
nothing thing like about me at all. I am more like an unfolding
narrative’. (82) Becoming aware of this impels us towards an ‘ethics of
empathy’, refusing to cling to habits and routines. We cannot hold on to
our ego to sustain our fragile and evanescent self; rather, Batchelor
urges: ‘Instead of taking ourselves so seriously, we discover the
playful irony of a story that has never been told in quite this way
before’. (83)
‘The more we become conscious of the mysterious unfolding of
life, the clearer it becomes that its purpose is not to fulfill the
expectations of our ego. We can put into words only the question it
poses. And then let go, listen, and wait’. (99) This reminds me of
moments in Shakespeare or Beckett, this bold staring down of ‘
shunyata’,
‘emptiness’ that we cannot define satisfactorily for its own notion
‘falls prey to the very habit of mind it was intended to undermine.’
(81)
Whether in an article I wrote earlier in this decade on Beckett’s
purgatories and liminality, a happenstance scrawl in a secondhand book,
or my ‘nightstand Buddhist’ study, I try to make sense out of my own
monologues, waking and dreaming. They vanish. But scripts remain, as
Seaver, Batchelor, Beckett, and even the Buddha know, ‘dramaticules’
enacted by others after we die and head towards whatever ‘unnameable’
emptiness will embrace us again.
While studying Batchelor, I wondered about Beckett’s
affinity, if any, with Buddhism. John Calder, Beckett’s publisher and
friend, considers the influence upon Beckett’s early work by a Belgian
follower of Descartes, Arnold Geulincx. Cited in
Murphy, the source of the first words spoken in
Waiting for Godot,
‘rien a faire’ or ‘nothing to be done’, Geulincx proposed a
proto-meditative reaction. (4) Calder stresses Beckett’s youthful quest
for truth within meditative philosophy rather than dogmatic theology.
Christian mystics such as Geulincx, Calder suggests, edge near Buddhism
‘particularly in the denigration or merging of the individual self into
the whole nature of the cosmos’. (5) Calder posits Murphy seeking
nirvana as ‘Beckett’s most Buddhist creation’, yet he does not
elaborate. Nor does Beckett himself on the influence of dharma.
Three massive biographies, by Deirdre Bair, Anthony Cronin, and
James Knowlson, make no mention of Buddhism within Beckett’s life; his
works do not mention the teachings directly. Yet, Calder finds a
connection, however tenuous. He claims that Beckett feared returning to
life, and how ‘intellectual superiority of Buddhism over monotheistic
religion, and the logic of reincarnation with the concept of even
ethical justice, was not lost on him’. (43) Stoically, without religious
belief yet never declaring himself an atheist, Beckett appears to
Calder a dualist, between hope and despair, the material and immaterial.
They might both have benefited from reading Batchelor.
Can philosophy align with Buddhist inquiry? Ben Howard cautions: ‘Zen
questioning is not the same as rigorous philosophical inquiry. To be
sure, Zen teachings engage metaphysical issues, most prominently the
‘Great Matter of life and death’. And insofar as they emphasize personal
responsibility and freedom of choice, Zen teachings share common ground
with existentialist thought. But unlike professional philosophy, Zen
eschews definitions, abstract categories, and other components of
systematic inquiry. Its way is more immediate, intuitive, personal, and
concrete’.
I found one book-length study on the topic.
Beckett and Zen
by Paul Foster presents a challenging monograph on two difficult
conceptions, one from that fearlessly inquisitive but honestly
unbelieving writer, one from two millennia of authors known and
unknown-- also distinguished for their refusal to speak but of the
ultimately Unnam[e]able, of our fragile place in this enigmatically
silent universe.
This aim nears an elusive target. Foster aligns Beckett's
dilemma-- there is no God vs. we must seek God-- with the goal for
Buddhism to veer away from a ‘monorail’ linear quest that traps
Beckett’s characters to see only before or behind themselves in their
existential exiles. Foster argues that their author, like his subjects,
lacked the ability to exit this doomed road. There Beckett's dilemma's
solved by leaving it and a/theism and existence as we know it and cannot
know it otherwise all behind. Yet a true adept rejects mental
constructs of a panicked ego. Zen searches for immersion into what’s
beyond anguished thought, careless diversion, or misleading faith: into
One Mind, the ultimate Unnameable.
In fact, Foster could have called it a ‘trilemma’, for not two but
three horns rise. We face a senseless world without God, we lament our
impotence, and we endure without solace. Foster, a longtime practitioner
of Zen, employs Beckett's examinations of the mind in his major prose
texts as a spiritual tool for exposing the ontological strengths, and
ultimately weaknesses, of what happens when, as Beckett dared, you sit
and contemplate your fate. Without bowing to a god, without killing
yourself, without total despair or total comfort. A grim scenario for
many of his characters and we his readers, but Foster delves into
formidable narratives to apply his Zen-mind to Beckett's men and women
who hesitate to make the ‘great leap’ demanded in Buddhism of those who
would gain power over their impotent selves.
In
Murphy, hints of Buddhism surface, but I agree with
Foster that these are passing and rather inconsequential. Still,
there's a poetic sense of life's fragility amidst the sharpened
exchanges of cruelty and cant. Three of my favorite passages: ‘He
thought of the four caged owls in Battersea Park, whose joys and sorrows
did not begin until dusk’. (106) ‘Is it its back that the moon can
never turn to the earth, or its face?’ (131) ‘Each leaf as it fell had
an access of new life, a sudden frenzy of freedom at contact with the
earth, before it lay down with the others’. (150)
As with Scripture, one can read back into Beckett a myriad of
critical intentions that the author may not have intended at all. For
Watt,
sophistry parodied wearyingly may veer near a Buddhist solution,
however unintentional, when it comes to nothingness. ‘The difference is
between the two is that where the one ends in brilliant but brick-wall
theory, the other finds a way over the wall in practice. Where the one,
like Watt, screams in an impasse of despair, the other initiates a
revolution of mind that transcends both self and impasse’. (Foster, 150)
The prose trilogy that Foster takes on presents problems. With
Molloy and
Malone Dies,
Foster ends his chapters on its first two installments at what to me
appears a brick wall. Both novels break down, and while Foster excels at
extracting fragments to shore up against ruin of the agonized
narrators, I sense that he cannot solve the dilemmas that Beckett
through his prose confronts without being able to resolve. The honesty
of Beckett prevents him from doing so.
Foster, as with his subject, does not back down from what Beckett
sneered or sighed at as ‘always the big questions’, and ‘the big
answers’ that we all seek in our own exodus from meanings that comforted
our ancestors, and may soothe our neighbors. For those among us who
cannot be eased by such resolutions, the prose trilogy stands as an
articulation of our refusal to submit, and of the pain this defiance by
its honesty causes within the psyche. Can one say soul?
For Foster, no. As a Zen adept, he knows that Beckett's
confrontation prevents the author from curing the dilemma that pierces
him and his creations.
The Unnamable tackles this in what
superficially at times nears a Buddhist stance, but Foster knows that,
given the cryptic and unstable narrative stance through which we hear
the story, we cannot ascribe so reductively or summarily any pat
solution to the momentous portents and baffling situations the
protagonist-- if he indeed acts at all in the final judgment-- expresses
so forlornly. It seems that Beckett steps back from the abyss, from
what Zen would offer as obliteration within the One Mind.
I add here my problem with Foster's presentation. Beckett has been
said to gain whatever knowledge of Buddhism he revealed via Arthur
Schopenhauer, but that philosopher may have confused the One Mind
direction of Buddhism with a Hindu ‘atman’-into-Oversoul version that
distorts Zen teaching. In turn, as Foster does not elaborate upon
Schopenhauer's interpretations of Buddhism, one's left to puzzle over
what echoed philosophies of Mind and Nothingness Beckett inculcated.
Here's a point where more elucidation would have helped ease what, given
the textual and intellectual challenges, remain tough questions to
address let alone resolve.
In the last text treated, the despairing (even by previous standards)
How It Is,
we're faced with faceless terrain that Foster compares to a prehistoric
creature clawing through primordial mud. Meditation approaches the
‘monster silences vast tracts of time perfect nothingness’ (cited 238)
of
How; Foster finds the abandonment of the narrator
approaching that required by the contemplative. Yet, Beckett draws again
away and thus this text as with his work's a ‘tragedy’.
It's all ‘doomed to failure’, for the monorail perspective locks
his narrators into infinite space and time without change, undeviating
from ‘mental tedium’ of memories. The failure's not artistic, but
cerebral. Foster compares our self to an onion, peeled down to its own
essence but leaving us with emptiness at its core.
This impasse, Foster argues, presents us with a poignant encounter
with how far Beckett comes, yet also how far he still had to go.
Beckett failed to overcome the predicament that ties him and his
narrators to the demands of the questioning ego, the relentless
inquirer, the despairing pawn. No practitioners, they may be by Zen
reckoning indeed doomed if they cannot escape ‘
samsara’ and the ties to the flesh, ego, and stubborn soul that keep us tethered, dragging, or bound to this plain, pained existence.
Foster borrows an image employed by Alan Watts. We’re two faces on
opposite sides of a coin, subject-object attempting to figure each
other out. Stuck in this binary opposition, the ‘coin's faces’ spin
about, failing to realize the thickness, the whatness, the ‘
quidditas’ of the coin's hidden dimension.
This third, unseen dimension for Watts (if not Beckett's searcher, dim-bulb as we more resemble
Watt)
equally runs in both — and permeates all — directions inside the coin
to unite its two sides. The two sides do not know of another way out;
locked side-by-side but on opposite ends, they lack understanding of
unseen unity. A new perspective extends the coin's definition beyond
obverse-reverse dichotomies. This awakening may then truly join us to
what we live within but we mistake as without.
Foster tackles the definition of the Void. He corrects Beckett
critics who misunderstood this notionless notion as if synonymous with
nihilism. A Zen practitioner, Foster argues that the Void nears more
Nirvana or better yet, what's beyond that extinguishment of categories
or oppositions that we can conjure up from our Cartesian dilemma. We
strive to escape this subject-object divide that traps us in ‘
samsara’ and prevents us from attaining awakening into ‘
samadhi’
that will eventually pull the disciplined and undeluded seeker into
realization of release from our body-mind problem. Liberation that
allows neither God nor universe, self nor soul. Perhaps an indescribable
realm, but we are scared because we stay ignorant, small, and frail.
Beckett's terrain crawls with stammering, cowed figures.
I wonder, then, how the Void that Foster finds Beckett and his
characters wrestling with — Jacob in an endless night battle with his
assailant angel, dawn breaking not with deliverance but death — fits
into not only Batchelor’s
‘playful irony of a story that has never been told in quite this way before’
or Seaver’s Antepurgatory but a cyclical universe? The place that we
may ‘know’ or posit that we cannot grasp. It's in this search where a
Buddhist tries to release the breakthrough beyond time and space, mind
or body.
Recently I found in Brian Clegg’s
Before the Big Bang the
notion of a brane, a multifold, crumpled, floating dimension a hair’s
breadth from ours that may, every ten or twenty billion years, brush
against our realm and annihilate it all, to start again, nearly ‘ex
nihilo’ as it obliterates any ‘anxiety of influence’, any progenitor
prior to a recurring Big Bang all over again out of background radiation
that has never not been. This may be a Big Splat, this spiralling and
colliding dance of not spheres but these ethereal planes, these branes. I
recall an ancient phrase: ‘the Mystic Law, uncreated and eternal, of
the Buddha of
beginningless time’.
Our sister universe drifts forever out of our reach. Clegg
explores how ‘Groundhog Universes’ may exist along the Big Crumple, the
dodahecadron-shaped possibility of a universe that eludes our whole
perception due to our inability to ‘see’ some of its directions. The Big
Bang may be replaced with a Steinhardt-Turok ‘bouncing branes’ model.
This may show another universe a millimeter away from ours with enough
ripples in the space-time fabric to allow for gravitational anamolies
and a sort of mirror-pattern that shows perhaps a universe previous to
the creation of our own.
A cyclically reoccurring, ekpyotic brane may float, like a flipped coin’s edge, near our own universe that by ‘
quidditas’
or whatness hovers nearly at our own point of entry. Our perception
escapes us by our own incomprehension or inarticulation to utter it and
to frame in words what cannot be perceived-- let alone conceived--
within language. Out of this encounter we cannot bear witness-- for in
it lies our cosmic formation and termination.
Yet, we can't help but wonder where we came from. The Buddha mused
about this life-essence out of the Void as form from emptiness: nirvana
‘Uncreated, Unformed, Unborn’. This search for our meaning, our purpose,
our existence fits neatly with Beckett's own bold if quixotic quest. We
must explore what we cannot explain, but what we're compelled to
attain.
Works Cited:
Batchelor, Stephen.
Buddhism without Beliefs. New York: Riverhead, 1997.
Beckett, Samuel.
Murphy. 1938. New York: Grove, 1970.
Calder, John.
The Philosophy of Samuel Beckett. Edison NJ: Riverrun and London: Calder, 2001.
Foster, Paul.
Beckett and Zen. Boston and London: Wisdom Publications, 1989.
Howard, Ben. ‘A Fundamental Perplexity’.
One Time, One Meeting. Blog. 18 Feb. 2010.
http://practiceofzen.wordpress.com/2010/02/18/53-a-fundamental-perplexity.
Seaver, Richard, ed.
I Can’t Go On, I’ll Go On: A Samuel Beckett Reader. New York: Grove, 1976.
Portions of this essay appeared on my ‘Blogtrotter’,
http://fionnchu.blogspot.com
A postscript: on Buddha.net, out of five pages of poetically
apropos observations uploaded by various hands (Emily Dickinson's three
poems shine terribly pure), Beckett is he who dies with the most quotes
wins. None explicitly about dharma or Buddha, but all the more apposite.
P.S. This 3000-word essay had existed until March 2012 at
Horizon Magazine, where it appeared 2010 in issue number 4. Edited by Mark A. Williams. As that site is defunct, I retrieved it via the Wayback Machine, embedding links to titles reviewed. It's inspired by--but does not duplicate-- material from my earlier article on Beckett's
purgatorial ideas in relation to medieval concepts, which was published as "Beckett's Purgatories" in
Beckett, Joyce, and the Art of the Negative. ed. Colleen Jaurretche. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005) 109-124. European Joyce Studies 16. My thinking evolves, and a related review article on Donald S. Lopez. Jr.'s
The Scientific Buddha: His Short and Happy Life (Yale UP, 2012) has transformed via
The Non-Buddhist,
"The Buddha as counter-evolutionary."
Apropos, I append this link and in a future revision/ expansion of this, it will shift my essay, as Paul Foster apparently was unaware of this crucial conversation, or his 1989 book had already been in press when this account appeared: Lawrence Shainberg, "
Exorcising Beckett."
The Paris Review 104 (1987). See also Shainberg's 1997
Ambivalent Zen memoir. Thanks to Glenn Wallis for excavating Shainberg's essay via Wallis'
"Samuel Beckett Stares at a Wall" at
Speculative Non-Buddhism.
P.P.S. Image:
Tate Gallery. "Nirvana" Augustus John. 1908. "In Buddhist theology Nirvana is the state of perfect
beatitude. It is the state where all passions are dissolved, the
extinction of individual existence and absorption into the Supreme
Being."